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Fielding congressional questioning during the financial crisis, former 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed his “distress” in 
discovering a “flaw” in his free-market beliefs:  “Those of us who have 
looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder’s 
equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.”1  The 
financial crisis has also prompted the jurist and famous Chicago School 
theorist Richard A. Posner to reconsider some of his earlier beliefs.2 
Some say that the Chicago School’s economic theories with their strong 
presumption of rational self-interested profit-maximizers with perfect 
willpower lost their luster within academic circles over twenty years ago 
with the rise of post-Chicago School game theories.  The post-Chicago 
School used rational actor models to challenge traditional Chicago 
                                                 
1
 Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122476545437862295.html. 
2
 See, e.g., John Cassidy, Interview with Judge Posner, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 13, 
2010 (interview with Posner) (“The more informal economics of Keynes has made a big 
comeback because people realize that even though it is kind of loose . . . it seems to have 
more of a grasp of what is going on in the economy.”), available at  
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-richard-
posner.html#ixzz0hJIhHeop; Marcus Baram, Judge Richard Posner Questions His Free-
Market Faith In “A Failure Of Capitalism,” HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 2009 (interview 
with Posner), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/20/judge-richard-posner-
disc_n_188950.html; RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 
AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).   
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predictions.  Nonetheless, antitrust’s economic theories, whether based on 
the Chicago,3 post-Chicago,4 or Harvard Schools,5 continue to assume 
rational self-interested market participants with perfect willpower. 
This rationality assumption is under attack from several inter-
disciplinary economic fields, most notably behavioral economics.  
Behavioral economics, the management consulting firm McKinsey and 
Company recently observed, “is now mainstream.”6  Even before the 
financial crisis, behavioral economics was a hot topic.  It is a staple in 
graduate economics programs, business schools, and increasingly in law 
schools.7  Recent best-sellers have featured behavioral economics, such as 
THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET,8 ANIMAL SPIRITS,9 PREDICTABLY 
IRRATIONAL,10 and NUDGE.11  Behavioral economics has also led to 
subspecialties in the areas of  
• subjective well-being and happiness;12  
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). 
4
 See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 113, at 134 (2d ed. 2000) 
(“Business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers”); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review & Critique, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 259 (2001); 
Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445-695 (1995). 
5
 William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct:  The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
101 (2007) (summarizing contributions of Harvard School to modern antitrust analysis). 
6
 Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case for Behavioral Strategy, McKinsey 
Quarterly 2 (March 2010). 
7
 Law schools, such as University of Tennessee, Yale, Harvard, and Georgetown offer 
behavioral law and economics seminars. 
8
 JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, 
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009). 
9
 GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS:  HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
(2009). 
10
 DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS (2008). 
11
 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
12
 RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 29–30 (2005); 
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• the media (including demand-driven media bias);13  
• marketing (including the paradox of choice);14  
• behavioral finance;15  
• criminal justice;16  
• sports;17 
                                                                                                                            
Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want? Competition Policy & the Role of 
Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 928-40 (2010); George 
Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation & the Role of Decision & Experience 
Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUBLIC ECON. 1795-1810 (2008); Daniel Kahneman & Alan 
B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 3-24 (2006); Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data 
in Economics, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (2006); Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be 
Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion, SCIENCE, June 30, 2006, at 1908-1910; 
Richard Layard, Happiness & Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession, 116 ECON. J. 
C24–C33 (2006); Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard 
of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161-181 (2005); Bruno S. Frey & 
Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 402-435 (2002). 
13
 See, e.g., Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Competition & Truth in the 
Market for News, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 133–154 (2008); Matthew A. Baum & Tim Groeling, 
New Media & the Polarization of American Political Discourse, 25 POL.  COMM. 345–365 
(2008); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from 
U.S. Daily Newspapers, NBER Working Paper 12707 (2007), available at 
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/matthew.gentzkow/biasmeas052507.pdf; Stefano DellaVigna 
& Ethan Kaplan, The Political Impact of Media Bias, in FACT FINDER, FACT FILTER: HOW 
MEDIA REPORTING AFFECTS PUBLIC POLICY (2007), available at 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/wp/mediabiaswb07-06-25.pdf; Charles S. Taber & 
Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J.  POL. 
SCI. 755–769 (2006); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media, Education & Anti-
Americanism in the Muslim World, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 117-133 (2004). 
14
 BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004); Simona 
Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social Welfare, 
25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 24 (2006).  As for the implications of the paradox of 
choice on the poor, see Marianne Bertrand et al., Behavioral Economics & Marketing in 
Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 8, 12 (2006). 
15
 2 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005); ROBERT J. 
SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2001). 
16
 Richard H. McAdams and Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and 
Economics (November 11, 2008), U. CHI. L. & ECON., Olin Working Paper No. 440, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1299963; Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice With 
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision 
Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188-200 (2006). 
17
 See, e.g., Devin G. Pope and Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? 
Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes (June 13, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419027. 
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• health care;18 
• behavioral political economy;19  
• behavioral institutional design;20  
• behavioral labor economics;21 and  
• behavioral industrial organization.22 
The financial crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak 
regulation, our lack of understanding about how many markets actually 
operate, and moral hazard.  The crisis has also prompted U.S. policymakers 
to reexamine the assumptions underlying the prevailing neoclassical 
economic theories.23  Competition authorities in the European 
Commission,24 U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading,25 and United States26 are 
                                                 
18
 See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral 
Economics Perspective, 53 SAINT LOUIS U. L. J. 1189 (2009). 
19
 Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. 
ECON. LIT. 315, 364 (2009). 
20
 Id. at 364-65. 
21
 Id. at 362-63. 
22
 Id. at 361-62. 
23
 John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Markets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 9. 
24
 Eliana Garcés, The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer and Competition 
Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 145 (2010); “Why Consumers behave the way they 
do: Commissioner Kuneva hosts high level conference on Behavioural Economics,” 
Reference No.  IP/08/1836 (Nov. 28, 2008), available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1836&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
25
 See, e,g., Office of Fair Trading, The Impact of Price Frames on Consumer Decision 
Making (May 2010), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/OFT1226.pdf; 
Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy?, 
6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 111, 118 (Spring 2010); Amelia Fletcher, “What do consumer 
policymakers need from behavioural economists?” available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/conference/video_fletcher_en.htm. 
26
 FTC Commissioner Rosch, for example, has been interested in the implications of 
behavioral economics for competition policy.  See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n,, Behavioral Economics:  Observations Regarding Issues that Lie Ahead (June 9, 
2010), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf; J. Thomas Rosch, 
Comm’r, Federal Trade Comm’n, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations on 
Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Jan. 
6, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100106financial-products.pdf.  Likewise, Carl 
Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and Joe 
Farrell, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, recently acknowledged that 
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interested in behavioral economics.  The American Antitrust Institute27 and 
antitrust scholars28 are turning to behavioral economics.  Soon enterprising 
antitrust lawyers may raise behavioral economics findings in white papers 
to the agencies or in federal court pleadings.  In fact, the behavioral 
economics literature was recently raised before the U.S. Supreme Court,29 
in a case where two Chicago School theorists (Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook) disagreed on the mutual fund industry’s efficiency.30 
The immediate question is to what extent the irrational conduct that 
behavioral economics identifies should have implications for evaluating 
whether conduct is anticompetitive.  The Chicago School’s neoclassical 
economic theories teach that irrationality is irrelevant to antitrust doctrine: 
                                                                                                                            
behavioral economics may offer insights relevant to antitrust and consumer protection 
analysis.  Roundtable Interview with Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, ANTITRUST SOURCE 
(February 2010). 
27
 At its 2008 annual meeting, the American Antitrust Institute’s (AAI) keynote 
speaker and panelists discussed the applicability of behavioral economics to competition 
policy. AAI, Audio Recordings from AAI’s Annual National Conference, 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/2008conferenceaudio.ashx (last visited Jan. 10, 
2010); see also AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE 
AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 
44TH PRESIDENT 26, 172, 185, 200–01, 272–75 (2008) (recommending more empirical 
analysis to further antitrust policies involving cartels, mergers, and media industries); 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, available at 
http://www.biicl.org/clf/clfmeetings2009/ (hosting a Competition Law Forum on 
behavioral economics in July 2009). 
28
 At the Next Generation of Antitrust Scholarship Conference held at NYU law school 
in January 2010, several papers applied behavioral economics to antitrust policy.  See Max 
Huffman, Behavioral Exploitation and Antitrust; Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, 
Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin, University of 
Haifa Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522948; Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral 
Economics Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL 
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT (Caron 
Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds. Hart Publishing Oxford forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535720. 
29
 Brief of Robert Litan, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Harris 
Assoc., No. 08-586 (U.S. June 17, 2009). 
30
 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc den. 527 F.3d 
627.  The Court ultimately eschewed the issue, 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1431 (2010), holding that 
the debate between Judges Easterbrook and Posner was “a matter for Congress, not the 
courts.” 
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rational firms eliminate irrationality from the marketplace.  After the 
financial crisis, however, one cannot assume that markets operate as 
efficiently as the Chicago School predicts.  Antitrust policymakers must 
inquire what role behavioral economics can play in the agencies’ 
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws.31 
With increasing interest in behavioral economics’ implications for 
competition policy, Part I of this Article provides an overview of behavioral 
economics.  Part II discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested 
profit-maximizers became so embedded in antitrust policy.  Part III 
discusses to what extent the behavioral economics literature can inform 
antitrust policies and cause lawmakers to question their neoclassically-
based assumptions.  Part IV offers several recommendations related to the 
practical application of behavioral economics to antitrust law going 
forward. 
I. OVERVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
A.  What Is Behavioral Economics? 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that humans are rational, self-
interested beings with perfect willpower.  In making determinations under 
their Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, for example, assume that actual 
behavior comports with rational, self-interested (i.e., profit-maximizing) 
behavior.32  In conduct cases, the U.S. federal courts dismiss complaints or 
grant summary judgment if antitrust plaintiffs’ theories do not make 
“economic sense,” such as alleging economically irrational behavior.33   
                                                 
31
 For purposes of this article, the relevant laws are Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. '' 1-2, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. ' 18. 
32
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines  § 
1.0 (2010), [hereinafter “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”] (“In evaluating how a merger will 
likely change a firm’s behavior, the Agencies focus primarily on how the merger affects 
conduct that would be most profitable for the firm.”). 
33
 Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261 
(2010); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (requiring a plaintiff plead 
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Behavioral economics uses methods from neuroscience and social 
sciences such as psychology and sociology to understand the limits of this 
assumption.34  Testing this rationality assumption through experiments,35 
behavioral economists find that people systematically and predictably do 
not behave in certain scenarios as neoclassical economic theory predicts.36  
Instead, behavioral economics characterizes human behavior as defined by 
three traits: bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-
interest. 
1. Bounded Rationality 
Rational agents in theory seek out the optimal amount of information 
and readily and continually update their prior factual beliefs with relevant 
and reliable empirical data.  It is similar to a treasure hunt:  as we receive 
new factual clues along the way, we revise our beliefs and modify our 
behavior.  In contrast, bounded rationality acknowledges the distinction 
between reasoning versus intuition.37  Consumers are not perfectly objective 
and rational Bayesians (in that they readily update prior factual beliefs 
whenever appraised of reliable information).  Instead, while we may 
maintain an illusion of objectivity, our goals (much like those of a 
prosecutor seeking to convince the court of the defendant’s guilt) can bias 
our beliefs about everything from our perception of ourselves, other people, 
and events, to the value of goods or services, to our evaluation of scientific 
                                                                                                                            
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). 
34
 For interesting surveys of the behavioral economics research, see MORAL 
SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN 
ECONOMIC LIFE (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
(Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004); DellaVigna, supra note 19; Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998). 
35
 DellaVigna, supra note 19; Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral 
Economics: Past, Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 
34, at 7.  
36
 Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. 
REV. 237, 242-43 (2008). 
37
 Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003). 
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evidence.38  As a result, we access only a subset of our relevant knowledge 
and give undue weight to evidence that supports our beliefs while 
discounting evidence that undercuts our beliefs.  
In one experiment, the subjects received the same twenty-seven pages of 
evidentiary materials from an actual Texas lawsuit filed by an injured 
motorcyclist against the driver of the automobile that collided with him.39  
Subjects were randomly assigned the role of plaintiff or defendant.  After 
reading the case materials, they predicted what the judge had awarded and 
what a “fair” settlement would be.  Participants playing the plaintiff 
predicted a significantly larger award by the judge (on average $14,527 
higher than defendants’ prediction).  The plaintiffs and defendants each 
recalled more arguments favoring their side, and weighed the arguments 
favoring their side more heavily.  In a later experiment, the subjects first 
read the case materials and offered their estimates of the judge's award and 
a fair settlement.  Only then were they told of their role as plaintiff or 
defendant.  Those who learned their roles after they offered estimates had 
closer estimates of the likely award, and were significantly more likely to 
settle. 
Another key insight of bounded rationality is that humans rely on rules 
of thumb (heuristics) in making decisions, and engage in a couple of steps 
of iterated reasoning.  For example, framing effects (the way the choice is 
framed, such as a sure gain or avoiding a loss) can alter the way we 
decide.40  In one experiment individuals were offered either a fifty percent 
                                                 
38
 Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 482-95 
(1990). 
39
 Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role 
of Self-Serving Biases, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 328.  
40
 Under the Asian Disease hypothetical, 600 people are expected to die.  The majority 
choose Program A (saving a sum certain of lives (200 people)) versus Program B (one-
third probability that 600 people will be saved (two-thirds probability that no one will be 
saved)).  Yet a substantial majority did not choose Program A when it presented a sum 
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chance of $110 or $50.  Rational profit-maximizers should opt for the 
greater discounted value – the 50 percent chance ($55); yet most people 
were risk adverse and opted for $50.  But when they stood to lose either $50 
versus a fifty percent chance of losing $110, many became risk seeking and 
opted for the latter.  Moreover, losses closer to a reference point hurt more 
than the joy from comparable gains.41  Bounded rationality encompasses 
other anomalies in human decision-making, including: 
• the endowment effect (when we demand much more to give up and 
sell an object than what we would be willing to pay to acquire that 
object);42 
• status quo bias (when the choice of default option impacts the 
outcome);43 
• anchoring effects (how a randomly chosen standard may 
subsequently influence a judgment on the same task);44  
• availability heuristic (when we assess the probability of an event by 
asking whether relevant examples come readily to mind);45  
                                                                                                                            
certain of deaths (400) versus Program B (one-third probability that 600 people will be 
saved (no deaths) and two-thirds probability that 600 people will die).  Kahneman, supra 
note 37, at 1458. 
41
 Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1456.   
42
 RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 63 (1992); Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1482, 1484, 1498; Daniel 
Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 
J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1327 tbl.1 (1990) (summarizing studies). 
43
  THALER, supra note 42, at 68-70. 
44
 One series of experiments is to establish an arbitrary initial price (such as the last 
two digits of one’s social security number) in the test subjects’ minds.  While that initial 
price is arbitrary, once it is established in their minds, it shapes what the subjects are 
willing to pay for that item and related items.  Ariely, supra note 1010, at 25-28; Englich et 
al., supra note 16 (describing how sentencing anchor can influence judges and 
prosecutors). 
45
 Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1467 (people estimating more words on page that end 
with “–ing” than have the second from last letter ending with “n” or estimating twice the 
number of murders in Detroit versus the state of Michigan).  
9-Aug-10] Behavioral Antitrust 11 
• representative heuristic (when we ignore the “base rates and 
overestimate the correlation between what something appears to be 
and what something actually is”);46  
• overconfidence bias (where, for example, executives in several 
behavioral studies were overconfident in their ability to manage a 
company, systematically underestimated their competitors’ strength, 
and were prone to self-serving interpretations of reality (such as 
taking credit for positive outcomes, and blaming the environment 
for negative outcomes));47  
• optimistic bias (when we believe that good things are more likely 
(and bad things less likely) than average to happen to us);48 and 
• hindsight bias (our tendency to overestimate the ex ante prediction 
that we had concerning the likelihood of an event’s occurrence after 
learning that it actually did occur).49 
                                                 
46
 Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1462; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law 
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1086 (2000) (citing Tversky and Kahneman’s bank teller problem).  
47
 C. Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors: A Survey of the Empirical Literature 
(May 2008) Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Preprint No. 2008/23 
7-8, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135184; DellaVigna, supra note 19. 
48
 Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to 
Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 313 (Thomas Gilovich eds. 2002). 
49
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 46, at 1095-1100. 
12 Behavioral Antitrust [9-Aug-10 
2. Bounded Willpower 
Willpower refers to the notion of self-control: when we know something 
is bad for us, we avoid it.  Bounded willpower, in contrast, refers to when 
we knowingly engage in actions known to be detrimental and therefore act 
contrary to our long-term interests.50  As anyone who has ever overeaten, 
overspent, or otherwise succumbed to temptation (despite having the best 
intentions not to do so) can confirm, many people are not very good at 
predicting their willpower. 
Recent neurological research has examined to what extent the 
discrepancy between short-run and long-run human preferences reflects the 
activation of different parts of the brain’s neural system.51  This research 
suggests that choices that involve an immediate reward can 
disproportionately activate the impulsive part of the brain (the Limbic 
system) rather than the more deliberative part of the brain that engages in 
long-term cost-benefit analyses (the Lateral Prefontal Cortex).52  At a 
practical level, these insights suggest that, in situations that involve a short-
term gain even at a long-term cost, we may not engage in the cost-benefit 
analysis expected under rational choice theory.   
Thus, recognizing our bounded willpower, we at times seek 
commitment devices.  We opt for automatic payroll deductions into 401(k) 
retirement plans, certificates of deposit, or other plans with liquidity 
restrictions to constrain our immediate consumption.53  We may place the 
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 Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1480. 
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 Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate & Delayed 
Monetary Rewards, SCIENCE, Oct. 13, 2004, at 503-507.   
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 For the effectiveness of changing the default option to automatic enrollment in 
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Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164-87 
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alarm clock further away, not shop when we are hungry, or set our watch 
slightly ahead of time.  These commitment devices – while a rational 
response to our bounded willpower – can lead us to “overcorrect” for our 
bounded willpower.54  We may pay more for less of what we like too much 
(such as buying cigarettes individually or by the pack rather than by the 
carton).  And, more generally, we may behave in ways contrary to the tenets 
of wealth maximization (such as giving the U.S. government an interest-
free loan by withholding too much taxes from our paycheck to ensure a 
return at tax time). 
3. Bounded Self-Interest  
Self-interest means people seek to maximize their wealth and other 
material goals, and generally do not care about other social goals, to the 
extent they conflict with personal wealth maximization.  Bounded self-
interest, the behavioral experiments confirm, means that human motivation 
is more nuanced and complex than this simplistic assumption of self-
interest.55 
Psychological and experimental economic evidence show that people 
care about treating others, and being treated, fairly.56  Recent experiments in 
bargaining settings, for example, systematically show “that substantial 
fractions of most populations adhere to moral rules, willingly give to others, 
and punish those who offend standards of appropriate behavior, even at a 
cost to themselves and with no expectation of material reward.”57  This 
                                                                                                                            
NBER Working Paper 12009 (Jan. 2006); Bridgette C. Madrian & Dennis Shea, The Power 
of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(K) Participation & Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149-
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REV. 103, 111-12 (1999) (discussing how sophisticated individuals recognize their 
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55
 Stucke, Money, supra note 12.  
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“strong reciprocity” in human behavior, however, also entails “a 
predisposition . . . to punish [at personal cost] those who violate the norms 
of cooperation, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be 
repaid . . . .”58  Similarly, behavioral experiments suggest that many people 
do not free ride at all (or to the extent that rational choice theory predicts).  
In these public goods experiments, “people have a tendency to cooperate 
until experience shows that those with whom they’re interacting are taking 
advantage of them.”59  Consequently individuals at times act benevolently 
even when it is not in their financial interest (such as tipping waiters and 
waitresses in cities they are unlikely to revisit) and will sacrifice monetary 
gains to punish those they feel are acting unfairly, such as by deviating from 
an established reference point of “fairness.”  
One frequently cited experiment of negatively reciprocal behavior and 
bounded self-interest is the “Ultimatum Game,” where a subject is given 
some money and must offer a second subject some portion thereof.  If the 
second subject accepts the offer, both can keep the money.  If the second 
subject rejects the offer, neither keeps the money.  Neoclassical economic 
theory predicts people will offer the smallest amount—one penny.  If 
everyone pursues their self-interest, the first subject would selfishly want as 
much money as possible; the second subject recognizes that a penny is 
better than nothing. 
But actual experiments of this Ultimatum Game in over twenty 
countries show the contrary.  In expanding the Ultimatum Game experiment 
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 Herbert Gintis et al., Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24 EVOLUTION & 
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 THALER, supra note 42, at 14. 
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to fifteen small-scale economies from twelve countries on four continents,60 
participants reciprocated and did not offer the nominal amount.  Nor did 
high financial stakes eliminate this bounded self-interest.61  Most offered 
significantly more than the nominal amount (ordinarily forty to fifty percent 
of the total amount available) and recipients about half the time rejected 
nominal amounts (less than twenty percent of the total amount available).  
Consequently, most receivers in this game forgo wealth to punish unfair 
offers, and offerors generally offer more than the nominal profit-
maximizing amount.62   Wealth may be still relevant to offerors, but unlike 
the self-interested profit-maximizer, they recognize the need for a sense of 
fairness and equity to maximize their return.  
Similarly, one recent study found that informal religious norms can play 
an important role in supporting a competitive market economy.63  The study 
measured the individuals’ propensities for fairness and willingness to 
punish unfairness.  The study involved fifteen populations that vary in their 
degree of market integration and their participation in a world religion (such 
as Islam or Christianity).  The financial stakes in the behavioral experiments 
were set at one day’s local wages.  The results reflected a stark contrast 
between nomadic, non-integrated, fully-subsistence societies with local 
religions (such as the Hadza population from Tanzania) and fully market-
incorporated societies with world-wide religions (such as the residents of 
Missouri, United States and Accra City, Ghana).  As market integration 
increases (as measured by the percentage of purchased calories in diet), so 
too people become generous (sharing more of the day’s wages with the 
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other player in the Dictator Game).  Likewise, as the society’s participation 
in Islam or Christianity increases, so too does the sharing in these 
behavioral experiments increase by about 6 to 10 percent. 
Aside from reciprocity, individuals at times may act from an intrinsic 
motivation, independent of any financial reward.  Indeed, financial rewards 
at times decrease (rather than increase) motivation or the likelihood of the 
desired results.64  Likewise, financial disincentives may not be as effective 
as social or ethical norms in curbing unwanted behavior.65 
B.  Some Criticisms and Shortcomings of Behavioral Economics, and 
Responses to Those Criticisms 
While amused by the behavioral economics literature, some question 
its applicability to individual (or firm) behavior in the marketplace.   
1. Representativeness 
One criticism is that behavioral economics focuses on certain persons 
not representative of the total population (namely university students) in an 
artificial setting (namely lab experiments).66  So naturally students’ 
decisions in experimental games with small financial stakes could differ 
from real market behavior with often greater financial stakes.67 
                                                 
64
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First behavioral lab experiments enable researchers to isolate variables 
and examine how behavior correlates with each variable (although one 
criticism from non-economists is that these experiments are an elaborate 
and costly way of telling us what we already know).  Moreover, today’s 
behavioral economics literature includes field experiments and data from 
actual market transactions.68  Not surprisingly, marketing companies are 
devoting resources on behavioral experiments and neuroscience to learn 
more about consumers’ behavior decisions.69 
2. Firm v. Individual Behavior 
A second criticism is that the insights from behavioral economics about 
individual behavior are not helpful in predicting firm behavior in 
competitive markets.  Market participants typically are repeat players who 
learn from and correct their mistakes.  Firms and their employees have 
greater incentives to rationally profit-maximize, as they often are subject to 
competitive pressures.70  Many firms benefit from the division of labor, and 
accordingly train or hire experts to capture the benefits from specialized 
knowledge.  Irrational participants eventually exit the market.  Thus, as 
Posner opines, “unusually ‘fair’ ” people will avoid or be forced out of 
“roughhouse activities—including highly competitive businesses, trial 
lawyering, and the academic rat race.”71  For several reasons, these 
criticisms are misplaced. 
First, neoclassical economists often use the stock market as the 
example that most closely approximates perfect competition.72  But how 
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many people after the financial crisis still have faith in the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, which posits that stock prices reflect their fundamental value 
(the discounted sum of expected future cash flow)?  The behavioral finance 
literature questions the degree of efficiency in the stock market and 
addresses the limits of arbitrage.73  Consequently, if irrationality is not 
driven out of supposedly perfectly competitive markets, why should we 
assume that irrationality is driven out in less efficient markets?  
Accordingly, the assumption that bounded rational consumers magically 
transform themselves individually or collectively into rational, far-sighted, 
strategic maximizers with perfect willpower upon entering the workplace is 
empirically suspect. 
Indeed there is evidence that firms as institutions may depart from 
rationality, although at times in different ways and degrees than individuals 
do.  People can behave differently depending on situational factors, such as 
when alone or in groups.74  Groups, at times, can minimize individual 
biases, but at other times (such as cults, mobs, and “groupthink”75) displace 
independent thinking.  Firm behavior itself can vary, as firms vary by 
purpose (non-profit versus profit), structure (partnership, family concern, 
conglomerate), national identity and cultural norms (local firm, 
multinational), regulatory environment (utility versus unregulated concern), 
and size (large versus small). 
Take, for example, the United States’ antitrust challenge of MIT and 
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eight Ivy League universities.76  For years the universities collectively 
determined the amount of financial aid for prospective students admitted to 
two or more of their universities.  MIT on appeal raised an interesting 
argument.  In a perfectly competitive market, price equals marginal cost, 
and no rational profit-maximizing firm (outside of a predatory pricing 
scheme) would price below marginal cost.  MIT priced its discounted 
tuition to needy students at substantially below its marginal cost of 
providing education for one year.  Because profit-maximizing companies 
would not engage in such “economically abnormal” behavior, MIT argued, 
its activity must be noncommercial.77  The Third Circuit rejected MIT’s 
argument.78  But it implicitly accepted that firms do not always behave as 
rational profit-maximizers. 
One explanation as to why firms behave irrationally is that firms cannot 
always monitor and deter bounded rational employees from acting contrary 
to the firms’ long-term interests.  As discussed infra, “CEOs may be overly 
optimistic about the profitability of mergers or other actions they 
undertake” and “managers might face incentives which induce them to care 
about relative rather than absolute profits.”79  Similarly, when executives 
conspire to fix prices, they are not always acting with their firms’ 
knowledge or at their behest. 
Second, bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest can affect 
competition through the individual behavior of the millions of atomistic 
self-employed workers who supply their services or products into the 
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supply chain.80  This group includes self-employed farmers, ranchers, 
fishermen, free-lance writers, doctors, lawyers, and architects.  These 
individuals can behave contrary to rational choice theory.81 
Third, bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest can affect 
competition through the individual behavior of the hundreds of millions of 
consumers.  Individuals in the U.S. spend annually trillions of dollars on 
goods and services ($3.201 trillion in purchases on credit, debit, and prepaid 
cards in 2009),82 so their bounded rational behavior can affect competition 
in many markets.  Even if firms were relatively more rational than 
consumers, behavioral economics is relevant in understanding consumer 
decision-making and how firms compete to help or exploit these bounded 
rational consumers. 
One staple of antitrust policy is predicting how consumers would 
respond to firms’ raising the price of their goods or services by a small but 
significant non-transitory amount.  Price frames, under rational choice 
theory, should not affect the consumers’ decision.  But the U.K.’s Office of 
Fair Trading (“OFT”) recently studied how firms can use price frames to 
exploit bounded rational consumers.83  The OFT’s behavioral experiment 
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found that consumers deviated from rational choice theory in the following 
five price frames: (i) “drip pricing,” where a lower price is initially 
disclosed to the consumer and additional charges are added as the sale 
progresses; (ii) “sales,” where the “sales” price is referenced off an inflated 
regular price (was $2, now $1); (iii) “complex pricing,” such as three-for-
two offers, where the unit price requires some computation; (iv) “baiting,” 
where sellers promote a special deal, but offer only a limited number of 
goods at that price; and (v) “time limited offers”, where the special price is 
available for a short period.  Consumers made more mistakes and were 
especially worse off under drip pricing and time-limited offers.  Thus one 
application of behavioral economics to antitrust is to model consumer 
behavior and consider the effect of this behavior on competition. 
As these observations suggest, the empirical question is not whether 
firms and consumers are equally irrational, but the degree and type of biases 
and heuristics that different firms display.  Not surprisingly, there is already 
a wide body of research on this topic in the business literature.  That 
literature discusses the substantial variation in the ways corporations learn 
(such as the routines and forms of organizational structure they use).84  The 
empirical and theoretical work on organizational learning rests on bounded 
rationality and offers several insights about how firms engage in different 
forms of intra-firm conduct to overcome their bounded rationality and to 
compete more effectively with other firms.85  Among the literature’s 
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insights:  
• firms that better implement and update their learning (such as 
through routines) can better collect and exploit their knowledge, 
yield greater productive efficiencies, and enjoy a competitive 
advantage;86   
• firms may improve feedback mechanisms, whereby employees 
can learn from their mistakes and improve their reasoning and 
willpower;87 
• firms can promote different social, ethical and moral values that 
affect firm behavior88 and therefore reduce their monitoring 
costs and increase their competitiveness by inculcating a unique 
identity.89  
Neoclassical economic theory, with its assumption of rational agents, 
offers few insights on such intra-firm behavior.  Logically, if firms behaved 
as rational profit-maximizers, one would not expect this form of 
competition.  Rational firms could not enjoy a competitive advantage in 
how they search and incorporate knowledge, since they all automatically 
search for and act upon the optimal amount of information.   One would 
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therefore not expect business executives to expend resources on improving 
their decision processes if they indeed behaved as rational profit-
maximizers.  Moreover, one would expect rational choice theory to 
dominate the MBA curricula.  Instead the strategic management texts, one 
survey found, provide “precious little support” for the Chicago School’s 
theory of the firm.90 
3. No Unifying Theory 
A third criticism is that behavioral economics, while identifying the 
predictive shortcomings of neoclassical economic theory, does not provide 
an alternative unifying theory to explain human or firm behavior.91  But this 
criticism misconstrues the purpose of behavioral economics.  Neoclassical 
economic theory has supplied an organizing principle, as well as an 
important level of nuance by importing new microeconomic thinking into 
competition law.  The purpose of behavioral economics is to augment 
neoclassical economic theory by providing more realistic assumptions of 
human behavior.  By teaching that humans may behave “predictably 
irrationally,”92 behavioral economics provides a mechanism for 
policymakers to consider whether and to what extent they should refine 
existing frameworks to account for nuances in human behavior.   
Behavioral economics does not necessarily call for less or more 
antitrust regulation. If anything, it draws into question our reliance on 
economic theory when the evidence suggest otherwise.  It calls into 
question our preoccupation with the cost of false positives (which has taken 
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prominence over the thirty years) while not attending to the cost of false 
negatives.  And, as discussed infra, it raises questions about our ability to 
predict outcomes and optimize efficiency through antitrust’s rule-of-reason 
standard, suggesting that antitrust’s prevailing legal standard be brought 
closer to rule-of-law principles. 
4. Rule-of-Law Concerns 
Another criticism is that even if neoclassical economic analysis does 
not indicate the correct result in every case, it has promoted greater 
predictability and consistency in antitrust analysis.93  Thus the fear is that 
behavioral economics will increase the range of outcomes reached in an 
antitrust case, and thus inject more unpredictability into competition law. 
We are sensitive to this concern.  Antitrust law must comport as much 
as feasible with rule-of-law principles.  Possible civil or criminal liability 
should not depend on the latest economic theory.  Neoclassical economic 
theory has provided a basis for evaluating antitrust cases, and in some cases, 
simply-stated legal norms.  Moreover, while economic theory has many 
dialects, it can provide a common language for competition authorities 
across the globe. 
But neoclassical economic theory has its imperfections.  First, as 
discussed infra, neoclassical theory, because of its dependence on a flawed 
assumption of rationality, provides an incomplete, and at times incorrect, 
account of competition.  Antitrust legal standards that rely on neoclassical 
theory can lead to high error costs, thereby undercutting the goals of 
competition law.  Through a more persuasive and complex theory of 
rationality, behavioral economics can provide a superior account of 
competition, can lead to more empirically-based presumptions in antitrust’s 
legal standards, and can result in more informed antitrust enforcement.  
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Second, it is debatable whether neoclassical economic theory’s reliance 
on the rule-of-reason, has provided the desired level of administrability, 
consistency, objectivity, and transparency to antitrust.94  The Supreme 
Court’s current rule-of-reason standard provides little predictability to 
market participants, and, in combination with class action mechanisms, 
subjects litigants and trial courts to the purgatory of “sprawling, costly, and 
hugely time consuming” discovery.95  The Court’s alternative per se 
standard is also unsatisfactory for evaluating many ordinary competitive 
restraints:  the risk of false positives counsels against expanding rules of per 
se illegality, while the risk of false negatives counsels against expanding 
predictability through rules of per se legality. 
As Justice Breyer observed in Leegin, “antitrust law cannot, and should 
not precisely replicate economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views.”96  
Instead, for legal standards in the antitrust context to serve their goals of 
prohibiting anticompetitive conduct while not sweeping in procompetitive 
conduct, they must be as precise as possible.  The insights from behavioral 
economics can facilitate that end by providing agencies, courts, and 
legislatures with an additional lens through which to understand the facts 
before them.  In some contexts, courts will conclude that the rule of reason 
is the best option.  But, it may also mean that in other contexts, lawmakers 
will take all of the available empirical economic evidence and create legally 
rebuttable presumptions.97  As we discuss infra, behavioral economics can 
play an important role in that endeavor by explaining how actual real-world 
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evidence that contradicts (or is unexplainable under) a neoclassical 
economic theory may nevertheless be insightful in understanding whether 
conduct is pro- or anti-competitive. 
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN ANTITRUST LAW 
 
Although behavioral economics, as Part I discusses, has become a 
growth stock, this Part discusses how the assumption of rational, self-
interested profit-maximizers became and remains embedded in antitrust 
policy. 
A.  The Chicago School’s Assumption of Rationality  
When Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws, it neither endorsed 
the assumption of a rational profit-maximizer, nor dictated the application 
of any particular economic theory.98  Congress instead sought to strike a 
balance between (a) providing the courts with sufficient latitude to shape 
those laws over time and (b) not giving the courts unfettered discretion to 
interpret the antitrust laws so as to advance a particular judge’s ideology.99  
For several decades, the Supreme Court utilized a variety of economic 
organizing principles in its antitrust jurisprudence.100  Broadly speaking, 
                                                 
98
 George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1, 3 (1982) (noting that a “careful student of the history of economics would have 
searched long and on hard . . . the day the Sherman Act was signed . . . for any economist 
who had ever recommended the policy of actively combating collusion or monopolization 
in the economy at large”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. 
L. REV. 213, 249-50 (1985) (“legislative histories of the various antitrust laws fail to 
exhibit anything resembling a dominant concern for economic efficiency”). 
99
 See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (noting that Congress “expected the 
courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common law tradition”) 
(internal citations omitted); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Co., 485 U.S. 717, 732 
(1988) (“The Sherman Act . . . invokes the common law itself and not merely the static 
content that the common law assigned that term in 1890.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“The legislative history makes it perfectly clear 
that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on 
common-law tradition.”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940) (noting 
that the “vagueness of [the Sherman Act’s] language” left it to the courts to give “content 
to the statute”). 
100
 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937 268 (1990) 
(“One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an 
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however, in the 30-year period that preceded the Chicago School’s 
inception, the Court sought four aims.101   
First, the Court generally (but not always) sought a rule that was 
administrable for generalist judges.102 With some notable exceptions, the 
Court turned to the Sherman Act’s legislative history or common law 
precedent as a basis for its rules.103 
Second, the Court sought legal rules to enhance predictability.  For 
example, in devising the thirty percent presumption for mergers, the Court 
sought to foster business autonomy:  unless business executives “can assess 
the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound business 
planning is retarded.”104 The Court’s role was to provide clearer rules on 
what was civilly (and criminally) illegal under the Sherman Act.   
Third, the Court sought to prevent the lower courts from being bogged 
down in difficult economic problems, such as trade-offs between inter- and 
intra-brand competition.105  Neither the courts nor litigants could weigh the 
reduction of competition in one area (such as intra-brand competition for 
Topco private-label products among Topco member supermarkets) versus 
greater competition in another area (such as inter-brand competition 
between Topco members’ private-label products and the major 
supermarkets’ private-label goods).106   
                                                                                                                            
‘economic approach to antitrust problems only in the 1970’s.  At most, this ‘evolution’ in 
antitrust policy represented a change in economic models.  Antitrust policy has been forged 
by economic ideology since its inception.”); see also William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 
Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000) 
(surveying the role of economics in antitrust since the Sherman Act’s inception).  
101
 Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 94, at 1401-06. 
102
 Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362 (“in any case in which it is possible, without 
doing violence to the congressional objective embodied in . . . [the statute], to simplify the 
test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and practical judicial 
administration”). 
103
 Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 94, at 1402-03.  
104
 Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362. 
105
 Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 94, at 1404-05. 
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 United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
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Fourth, not only was this weighing beyond its competence, the Court 
recognized that the legislature, while subject to rent-seeking, was more 
politically accountable than the judiciary; so Congress must make these 
normative trade-offs.107 
The Court’s implementation of these principles resulted in a period of 
unprecedented victories for antitrust enforcement.  In the collusion context, 
the Court used per se tests to condemn a broad range of conduct including 
tying arrangements that conditioned the sale of one product upon the 
buyer’s agreement to purchase a second product,108 non-price vertical 
restraints through which a manufacturer limited its resalers to specific 
geographic areas,109 and the adoption of exclusive sales territories by 
marketing joint ventures.110  In the merger context, in its 1963 decision in 
Philadelphia National Bank, the Court aimed for a presumption consistent 
with the Congressional concerns in the 1950 Clayton Act amendments to 
deal with the rising tide of economic concentration in the American 
economy.  The Court sought a presumptively anticompetitive post-merger 
market share that was based on figures in its earlier Clayton Act contract-
integration cases that was also consistent with prevailing scholarly 
opinion.111  The Court also, however, placed horizontal mergers creating 
market shares below 10 percent in question.112 
As scholars have noted, “[t]here was considerable consistency between 
judicial decisions and economic thinking during the 1940s, 1950s, and 
                                                 
107
 Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 94, at 1405-6. 
108
 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
109
 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).   
110
 Topco, 405 U.S. 596.  
111
 Id. at 365-66. 
112
 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (enjoining a merger 
between two Los Angeles grocery chains with no more than 7.5 percent of retail sales); 
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966) (blocking a merger between 
two brewing firms that together accounted for 24 percent of beer sales in Wisconsin, 11 
percent of sales in a three-state area of the upper Midwest, and less than 5 percent of sales 
nationally, holding that the Clayton Act was violated “in each and all of these three areas”). 
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1960s.”113  But that consistency did not, in the eyes of the Court’s critics, 
provide the doctrinal certitude that antitrust law required.  Beginning in the 
mid-1970s, the Chicago School’s neoclassical economic theories began to 
serve that role.114 
Although the “basic features of the Chicago [S]chool of antitrust 
analysis are attributable to the work of Aaron Director in the 1950s,”115 
Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox116 is widely considered to have laid the 
foundation for the Chicago School’s incorporation into federal antitrust law.  
Judge Bork argued that contrary to early thinking, the Sherman Act’s 
legislative history “displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of 
promoting consumer welfare,” a term which Bork gave a different meaning 
than others.117  As the Chicago School recognized, defining the goal of 
antitrust is paramount.  This is because “[e]verything else follows from the 
answer we give.”118  So to make the rule of reason “more manageable,” the 
Chicago School adopted the position “that the essential spirit of the Rule is 
to condemn only those practices that are, on balance, inefficient in the 
economic sense.”119 
The Chicago School next elevated the importance of the rationality 
assumption.  Although Posner once said that the “basic tenet of the Chicago 
                                                 
113
  See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 52. 
114
 For a detailed discussion of the rise of the Chicago School, see Kovacic & Shapiro, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 52-55; Stucke, Behavioral, supra 
note 62, at 537-44. 
115
 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
925 (1979); see generally Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade 
Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956).  
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  BORK, supra note 3.  
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 Id. at 61 (arguing that the overriding policy goal behind Sherman Act is consumer 
welfare and that Congress intended to accomplish that end by protecting economic 
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halt of its bashing. See Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
879, 882 (1990). 
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 BORK, supra note 3, at 50. 
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 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on 
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1977). 
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school” is that “problems of competition and monopoly should be analyzed 
using the tools of general economic theory,”120 economists disagree on what 
those tools are.  So the Chicago School differentiated itself by starting 
“from the strong assumption that market participants are rational profit 
maximizers.”121  Adopting this presumption allowed Chicago School 
theorists to more easily predict how rational profit-maximizers should act. 
A key component in the Chicago School’s thinking is not that rational 
decision-making leads to perfect decision-making, but that markets are self-
correcting and will counteract faulty decision-making.  Except for the rare 
cases of price-fixing, mergers to monopoly, or other sustained market 
failures,122 government intervention is often seen as unnecessary and 
harmful.  The Chicago School’s theories do not treat firm behavior any 
differently from individuals’ collective behavior.   
As Posner, Federal Trade Commissioner William Kovacic, and others 
have noted, it is inaccurate to say that the emphasis modern federal antitrust 
law has placed on neoclassical economics is solely attributable to the 
Chicago School.123  Nevertheless, whether characterized as Chicago, post-
Chicago,124 or Harvard125 School theory, antitrust’s economic theories for 
                                                 
120
 Id. at 933-34. 
121
 Posner, supra note 115, at 933-34 (explaining that neoclassical theories rely on the 
“basic tenet” that “problems of competition and monopoly should be analyzed using the 
tools of general economic theory,” including, chiefly, the core theoretical assumption that 
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&.HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 137 (“Business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit 
maximizers”). 
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 Posner, supra note 115, at 933. 
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 Kovacic, supra note 5, at 109; Posner, supra note 115, at 931 (concluding that, 
because of the convergence between the Harvard and Chicago Schools’ thinking, “it is no 
longer worth talking about different schools of academic antitrust analysis”); see also 
Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 
1918-20 (2009) (discussing overlap among Chicago, post-Chicago, and Harvard Schools). 
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 The post-Chicago approach, which uses game theory to examine ways in which 
established firms behave strategically in comparison to actual and potential rivals, has 
supplied a well-developed body of literature that highlights a broader view of predatory 
pricing and predatory and exclusionary behavior more generally.  Under the post-Chicago 
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the past thirty years have largely assumed rational profit-maximizing 
market participants with willpower. 
B.  How the Rationality, Profit Maximization, and Efficiency Assumptions 
Permeate Modern Federal Antitrust Law 
As a result of the Chicago School’s “powerful simplifications,” such as 
“rationality, profit maximization, the downward sloping demand curve”126 
neoclassical economic principles now underlie much of modern federal 
antitrust law and pervade the doctrinal analysis that governs Section 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act as well as merger review.  
In the Section 1 context, which involves unreasonable restraints of 
trade, the Chicago School’s rational choice theories played a central role in 
the Supreme Court’s shift from its per se to its rule-of-reason standard.127  
In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,128 the Court overturned United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,129 and held that non-price vertical 
restraints were subject to the rule of reason.  Then in State Oil Co. v. 
Khan,130 the Court discarded its per se ban on maximum resale price 
maintenance agreements.  Citing Posner’s Seventh Circuit decision, Bork’s 
                                                                                                                            
School work, firms with substantial market power can engage in exclusionary conduct by 
raising their rivals’ cost. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L. 
J. 209 (1986).  
125
 Kovacic, supra note 123, at 170 (noting that Harvard School, through the 
contributions of Donald Turner, Phillip Areeda, and Justice Stephen Breyer, “had as much 
to do as Chicago with creating many of the widely-observed presumptions and precautions 
that disfavor intervention by U.S. courts and enforcement agencies”); see also Einer 
Elhauge, Harvard Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions?, 3 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 2, Autumn (2007). 
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 Posner, supra note 115, at 931. 
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School’s Influence on Antitrust, GCP (Global Competition Policy) MAG. 7, Apr. 15, 2009 
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 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
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Antitrust Paradox, and Areeda and Hovenkamp’s treatise,131 the Court 
reasoned that a per se rule was inappropriate where “a considerable body of 
scholarship” suggested maximum resale price maintenance agreements 
were procompetitive and provided “insufficient economic justification for 
per se invalidation” of those agreements.132  More recently, in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc.,133 the Court overruled its nearly 
century-old per se rule against vertical minimum price-fixing.134  The Court 
again turned to the thinking of the Harvard and Chicago Schools and cited 
as authority an amicus brief by several economists to support the 
proposition that “authorities in the economics literature suggest the per se 
rule is inappropriate, and there is now widespread agreement that resale 
price maintenance can have procompetitive effects.”135 
The departure from per se rules has its roots in the Chicago School’s 
belief that the false negatives (and administrative costs) that result from the 
Court’s rule-of-reason standard are far less significant than the false 
positives that follow from its per se rules.  False negatives are not a concern 
if one strongly believes in self-correcting markets arising from self-
interested rational market participants.  Instead the greater concern is that 
government restraints (in the form of per se rules or legal presumptions of 
illegality) represent a greater threat to market efficiency. 
Nevertheless, while embracing its rule-of-reason standard, the Court 
                                                 
131
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LAW (1988 Supp.). 
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 Leegin, 551 U.S. 887. 
134
 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
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 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900 (citing Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007)).  
See also Elhauge, supra note 125 (arguing that, while the Chicago School would have 
advocated for a rule of per se legality in the context of vertical restraints, the Court’s 
adoption of the rule of reason demonstrates that the Court followed the teachings of the 
Harvard School). 
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has, more recently, complained of antitrust’s “interminable litigation,”136 
“inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase,”137 the risk of “frivolous” 
suits,138 and the “unusually” high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust 
courts.139  So the current Court, like the earlier Warren and Burger Courts, 
lacks confidence in the judiciary’s ability to examine difficult economic 
problems.  But rather than provide more guidance for courts reviewing 
antitrust violations under Section 1, the Court now requires the lower courts 
to undertake a complex economic rule-of-reason analysis with relatively 
little concrete guidance.   
Put differently, the importation of the neoclassical ideas in construing 
Section 1 has the left the Court in an awkward position.  On the one hand, 
the Court has relied on the Chicago School’s organizing principles to 
introduce increased complexity in the law:  if neoclassical economic theory 
suggests bright-line rules are prohibiting procompetitive conduct, the 
Court’s response has been to expand the rule of reason.  On the other hand, 
the Court has resorted to the Chicago School’s principles as a justification 
for simplifying antitrust law by placing the upmost weight on 
administrability and predictability when creating bright-line rules that 
essentially immunize conduct deemed economically irrational. 
The Court’s construction of monopolization claims under Section 2 
likewise has shifted as a result of the Chicago School’s influence, 
particularly in the predatory pricing context where the Court has crafted 
liability rules that are premised on the assumption that firms behave 
rationally.  Under neoclassical thinking, predation claims specifically and 
                                                 
136
 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
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attempted monopolization claims generally are highly unusual in the 
presence of low entry barriers and rational market participants.  For any 
attempted monopolization claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that entry 
barriers in the relevant market are “significant” and “substantial” enough to 
confer monopoly power.140  Notwithstanding the firm’s intent to 
monopolize a market and its anticompetitive conduct, the court could find 
that rational profit-maximizing entrants will materialize and rescue the 
consumer.  Similarly no rational firm would engage in predation given the 
difficulty of recouping its losses.141  This reasoning led Frank Easterbrook 
in 1981 to opine that “there is no sufficient reason for antitrust law or the 
courts to take predation seriously.”142  This view has largely carried the day 
at the Supreme Court.143 
In Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,144 for example, 
the Court observed a “consensus among” Chicago School “commentators 
that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely 
successful.”  The Court adopted Bork’s view in The Antitrust Paradox that 
“[a]ny agreement to price below the competitive level requires the 
conspirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them,” and, 
as such, “[f]or the investment to be rational, the conspirators must have a 
reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, 
more than the losses suffered.”145 
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 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 145 (“Any realistic theory of predation recognizes 
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 Id. at 264. 
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 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89 (citing R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 145 
(1978)).   
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Likewise, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corporation146 (which Bork successfully argued), the Court relied on 
Matsushita and the writings of various prominent Harvard and Chicago 
School scholars to declare that conduct will not amount to predatory pricing 
unless (1) the alleged scheme involved pricing below some measure of cost 
and (2) the predator had a rational prospect of recouping its losses from 
such below-cost predation.147  Consistent with the wealth-maximizing 
assumptions that underlie both schools of thought, the Court observed that 
“[r]ecoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing 
scheme.”148  Most recently in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons 
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc.,149 the Court applied its Brooke Group test to 
claims of predatory bidding.  “Without such a reasonable expectation” of 
recoupment, the Court wrote, “a rational firm would not willingly suffer 
definite, short-run losses.”150  Given the risks in recoupment, a “rational 
business will rarely make this sacrifice.”151   
But the Court’s reliance on rational choice theory in Brooke Group and 
Weyerhaeuser is inconsistent with its recoupment requirement.  The Court’s 
premise is that firms are rational and self-interested.  If true, firms 
ordinarily would price their products at or above their marginal cost.  
Rational firms, Bork believed, would rarely if ever incur the substantial 
losses in pricing below marginal cost, unless they believed that the future 
supra-competitive profits, appropriately discounted, would exceed the 
immediate losses.152  So if rational profit-maximizing firms were pricing 
below marginal cost, this reveals their reasonable expectation of 
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recoupment.  Under rational choice theory, the antitrust plaintiff should 
recover simply by proving that defendant’s prices were below marginal 
cost.153  But the Court requires antitrust plaintiffs to separately prove a 
reasonable expectation of recoupment.  This second element provides 
antitrust defendants another opportunity to avoid liability.  Even if pricing 
below marginal cost, defendant could argue that entry barriers are 
sufficiently low, so that rational profit-maximizers would defeat any 
attempted exercise of market power.  If true, defendant, under rational 
choice theory, should not have priced below marginal cost in the first place.  
Although the Court has not adopted the Chicago School’s view of per se 
legality for predatory pricing,154 its rule essentially immunizes conduct 
deemed economically irrational.155 
Apart from the Sherman Act, the neoclassical economic theories’ 
rationality assumption has influenced U.S. merger law.  Some described the 
1982 Merger Guidelines as “a product of the new economic orientation in 
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antitrust law, if not an outright product of Chicago School economic 
theories.”156  These principles can be seen in two respects. 
First, in response to critiques by Bork and others from the Chicago and 
Harvard Schools that the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
prohibited mergers among small firms that could generate efficiencies, the 
agencies allowed for a more fulsome consideration of efficiencies in the 
1982 Guidelines.157 
Second, consistent with the Court’s decision in General Dynamics158 the 
1982 Guidelines embraced the neoclassical idea that, concentration ratios 
notwithstanding, a firm’s market share may not accurately reflect the firm’s 
long-term competitive viability.  Thus, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) serves to reduce the risk of false positives by creating what are 
generally viewed as “safe harbors.”  If a merger’s HHI (a measure of the 
industry concentration that will result from the merger)159 falls within those 
safe harbors, the merger is typically not challenged.  On the other hand, 
high market shares post-merger in highly concentrated industries are 
insufficient.  The antitrust agencies must still prove a compelling 
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competitive effects story (namely how this merger significantly increases 
the risk of coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive effects), and why the 
exercise of market power won’t be squelched by the entry (or expansion) of 
rational profit-maximizing firms. 
In short, since the Chicago School’s ascendance in the mid 1970s, 
antitrust law has embraced neoclassical principles at every turn.  While 
these principles may have been motivated by the desire to increase 
predictability (and, in turn, fewer false positives), it is not altogether clear 
that the neoclassical antitrust theories led to those results.  In some cases, 
the desire to subject conduct to a rule-of-reason framework so as not to 
prohibit procompetitive conduct decreased predictability.  As discussed 
below, the behavioral economics literature provides insights into ways to 
further sharpen antitrust rules to result in fewer false positives and false 
negatives over the long run. 
III. HOW CAN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS INFORM ANTITRUST POLICIES? 
As the survey in Part II suggests, neoclassical economic theory now 
covers the landscape in federal antitrust law.  When the antitrust agencies 
and federal courts analyze anticompetitive conduct or evaluate a proposed 
or consummated merger, they generally apply certain assumptions about 
firm and individual behavior, including:  (i) markets characterized with low 
entry barriers do not pose antitrust concerns; these markets are not 
susceptible to the prolonged exercise of market power because rational 
profit-maximizers will enter; (ii) many mergers generate significant 
efficiencies; (iii) rational big buyers often thwart the exercise of market 
power; and (iv) general deterrence of cartels is achievable under optimal 
deterrence theory. 
These assumptions – which are based on the tenets of neoclassical 
economic theory of plausible behavior – can and do have outcome-
determinative effects.  Federal courts regularly grant defendants’ summary 
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judgment motions if plaintiffs’ antitrust claims do not make “economic 
sense,” such as alleging economically irrational (non-profit-maximizing) 
behavior.160  Now Twombly has opened the door for defendants at the 
pleading stage to argue that plaintiffs’ antitrust claims are economically 
implausible.161  Similarly, “[c]urrent U.S. merger enforcement policy,” 
reported the Antitrust Modernization Commission, “is premised on 
assumptions about how concentration and other market characteristics (such 
as ease of entry) affect competition and market power.”162  The problem the 
AMC identified is that the “[e]mpirical evidence gives only limited support 
for these assumptions.”163  As one former antitrust official observed, the 
agencies’ “merger review process is applied sparingly” as the “vast majority 
of transactions” (approximately 97 percent) “are cleared within the initial 
waiting period.”164 
This is all to say that assumptions play a critical role in winnowing the 
types of conduct that go to discovery and/or trial as well as the number of 
mergers that the antitrust agencies actually review as potentially anti-
competitive.  If the assumptions are infirm, then conceivably some of the 
conduct that is exonerated and the mergers that are not reviewed may be 
anticompetitive. 
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A.  Assumption that Rational Profit-maximizers Will Defeat the Exercise of 
Market Power in Markets Characterized with Low Entry Barriers 
Neoclassical antitrust analysis treats the potential for entry as significant 
– if not sometimes dispositive – in determining whether the existing market 
participants will exercise market power.  The analysis assumes that markets 
characterized with low entry barriers are not susceptible to the prolonged 
exercise of market power because (1) supra-competitive prices will attract 
rational profit-maximizing firms, (2) these new entrants will replenish the 
lost output, and (3) as a result of entry, prices will return closer to marginal 
cost.  
With the exception of criminal prosecutions of cartels,165 this 
assumption pervades the Sherman Act case law.  In the Section 1 context, 
courts have observed that the absence of entry barriers means a predatory 
pricing conspiracy is implausible.  In Matsushita, plaintiffs argued that they 
had adduced facts to show a plausible conspiracy to engage in predatory 
pricing.  The Supreme Court, however, observed that the antitrust plaintiffs 
“offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant market is especially 
difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to 
maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time.”166  
Likewise, in the Section 2 context, for Bork and others, monopolies 
(other than those protected by the government) are short-term phenomena: 
the innovator’s supra-competitive profits serve as bait for imitators, who 
“first reduce and then annihilate [the monopolist’s] profit,” which reverts to 
the competitive mean.167  Innovation attracts imitation, which leads to 
commoditization.  Courts therefore will frequently analyze whether a firm 
                                                 
165
 One success by DOJ prosecutors is in preserving the Court’s per se rule on 
horizontal price-fixing, bid-rigging, market or customer allocations, or output reductions.  
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BORK, supra note 3, at 195-97. 
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can attempt to monopolize, or monopolize, a market by examining the 
likelihood of entry.168 
Entry barriers are also a key factor under the Merger Guidelines.  The 
federal antitrust agencies lost a series of merger challenges when courts 
found that easy entry would deter any anticompetitive effects.169 The 
agencies thereafter adopted a more extensive entry provision in their  
Guidelines, which set forth what the agencies believe is required for entry to 
be “timely, likely, and sufficient to deter or counteract anticompetitive 
effects.”170  Merger analysis for the agencies “generally entails a 
hypothetical analysis of entry.”171  In markets where entry theoretically 
would be timely (i.e., occurring in less than two years), likely, and sufficient 
in magnitude, character and scope to deter the exercise of market power, 
then the “merger is not likely to enhance market power.”  For mergers 
subject to a Second Request between the years 1996 and 2003, the FTC 
stated that it took no enforcement action where its staff concluded that entry 
would be timely, likely, and sufficient under the Merger Guidelines 
criteria.172 
When the antitrust agencies believe that entry barriers are sufficiently 
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low to defeat the exercise of market power post-merger, there is typically no 
mechanism to minimize the risk of false negatives.  Private parties and the 
state attorneys general infrequently challenge mergers.173  On the other 
hand, if the agencies believe that entry barriers are sufficiently high to 
enable the exercise of market power, mechanisms exist to reduce the risk of 
false positives.  The merging parties can seek to persuade a generalist court 
(which is less familiar about these antitrust issues than the agencies) that a 
hypothetical rational entrant would defeat the exercise of market power.  
The Section 7 case law is consistent with this approach: the merging parties 
can use evidence of low entry barriers to successfully rebut any 
presumption of anticompetitive harm. “In the absence of significant 
barriers,” the courts assume, “a company probably cannot maintain 
supracompetitive pricing for any length of time.”174 
The problem is that our understanding regarding the impact of ease of 
entry on competition is, as the AMC found, “limited.”175  The behavioral 
literature identifies two market-entry error types:  (1) excess entry (i.e., 
entry that fails because it is economically irrational), and (2) sparse entry 
(i.e., entry that should but does not occur because a firm exhibits 
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irrationality in failing to pursue entry).176  Both categories of market-entry 
error can cast light on ways in which antitrust law’s assumptions about 
entry are imperfect. 
Excess Entry.  Entry occurs in some industries when it is economically 
irrational.  Indeed, some industries “see perennially high rates of entry, 
increase[d] competition, and high rates of failure.”177  The behavioral 
economics and behavioral finance literature offers at least three possible 
explanations for this tendency. 
One explanation is the “optimism bias” or “positivity illusion.”178  The 
notion is that when individuals judge their likelihood of experiencing a 
good outcome in an event that they have some control over – obtaining a 
favorable job, financial security, or marriage – they overestimate their 
likelihood of success.179  In contrast, when individuals estimate the 
probability that something negative will happen to them – a car accident 
from reckless driving, a loss in the stock market, or divorce – they 
underestimate its likelihood. 
Economists Camerer and Lovallo have shown that this optimism bias 
carries over to entry decision-making.180  Their work found that, while 
participants in a given market may correctly realize that the average 
entrant’s profit would be negative, the individual participants will 
incorrectly expect that their own profits will be positive.  Moreover, their 
work found that optimism bias is most pronounced in situations they 
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describe as “reference group neglect,”181 where the potential entrant 
believes it has a particular expertise or skill in the given market – even 
where the entrant knows that its competitors believe that they have a special 
skill.  There “is more entry when people are betting on their own relative 
skill rather than on a random device” and “[t]he more surprising finding is 
that overconfidence is even stronger when subjects self-select into the 
experimental sessions, knowing their success will depend partly on their 
skill (and that others have self-selected too).”182 
A second and related explanation is that entrants may be driven by the 
desirability bias.  Desirability bias (or “wishful thinking”) is the tendency of 
individuals to predict favorable outcomes in external events that they have 
no control over, but whose outcomes nevertheless implicate their self-
perception.183  Such errant predictions may occur if entrants (i) overestimate 
the likelihood that a market participant (or participants) will fail or (ii) 
underestimate the likelihood of events in the economy that will negatively 
affect their prospects of success.  In terms of antitrust, a party entering a 
market with low entry barriers could overestimate the likelihood that it 
would obtain the financing to succeed over the long run or underestimate 
the likelihood that new entrants against whom it will compete for market 
share will succeed.  As Professor Avishalom Tor, who has extensively 
written in the area of behavioral antitrust, has observed “entrants who 
overestimate their prospects are more likely to fail than entrants who make 
accurate average estimates, but their presence also decreases other entrants’ 
probability of success and changes the composition of the final cohort of 
                                                 
181
 Id. at 315. 
182
 Id. at 310-16. 
183
 See Robert A. Olsen, Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: 
Some Evidence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISIONMAKING 65, 65 (1997) (defining 
desirability bias as “the tendency to overpredict desirable outcomes and underpredict 
unwanted outcomes”); see also Tor, supra note 178, at 508-510, 515-516 (discussing the 
application of desirability bias to entry in the antitrust context). 
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successful entrants.”184  
A third and related bias is when entrants’ focus on themselves rather 
than understanding competition.  One qualitative field study of 
entrepreneurs found that those who started their own businesses thought 
about their personal abilities, but “rarely mentioned external factors such as 
the capacity of the market they were entering or the strength of their 
competitors.”185  Thus entrants over-enter markets they perceive as easy for 
them (such as restaurants), and do not research the external environment or 
competition.186 
Sparse Entry. At other times, entry does not occur when it is 
economically rational.  Thus companies can maintain supracompetitive 
pricing in markets with low entry barriers.  Between 1988 and 1996, the 
DOJ prosecuted criminally cartels in dozens of industries that, on the 
surface, appear to have moderate or low entry barriers, including turtles, 
chain link fences, and bicycle retailers.187 Other recent cartels involved 
college textbooks,188 packaged ice,189 scrap metal,190 bid rigging at public 
real estate foreclosure auctions,191 and retail gasoline and diesel fuel.192  The 
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behavioral economics literature offers two possible explanations for the 
absence of entry in these markets. 
One explanation is that, while information is available, individuals do 
not react to risk or uncertainty as a rational profit-maximizer would.  The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, like rational choice theory generally, assumes 
that so long as information is publically available, rational profit-
maximizing traders will enter financial markets if there are irrational price 
moves to maintain market efficiency.193  Thus, under the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, stocks are consistently priced at a “rational” level:  stock prices 
of actively traded companies quickly adjust to reflect the rational 
expectations generated by information as it becomes available.194  As recent 
events have proven (and as the behavioral finance literature shows), rational 
arbitrageurs do not, however, always exploit obvious fiscal opportunities to 
restore prices to their fundamental value.195  The behavioral finance 
literature also suggests that sparse entry may result from the fact that the 
information needed to make a rational decision about entry can be costly to 
acquire, process, and verify.196 
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A second explanation for sparse entry is the flipside of the 
overconfidence bias:  while people are overconfident with respect to easy 
tasks, they rate themselves well below average on difficult tasks.   So rates 
of entry, in one behavioral experiment, differed dramatically for difficult 
and simple tasks.  In the experiment, participants over-entered when the 
quiz was simple (69% of the time), but less often on rounds when the quiz 
was difficult (39% of the time), even though they stood to profit in entering 
the difficult rounds.197  There was no evidence that the university students 
learned to avoid these mistakes over 12 rounds.198   In basing entry largely 
on their myopic judgment, the participants failed to see profitable 
opportunities where less competition existed. 
These insights from the behavioral literature suggest that hypothetical 
entry barriers are only part of understanding entry.  At times, some proclaim 
to the antitrust agencies that they would enter in response to a small but 
significant nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP).  Accurately predicting 
an entrant’s success, however, requires a more complete understanding of 
the biases that skew the entrant’s wealth maximization calculus.  At other 
times, even if entry barriers are low, entry will not occur despite the profit 
opportunity.  A more fulsome entry analysis should therefore consider 
factors apart from entry barriers, such as: (i) why entry does not occur in 
markets when antitrust’s economic theory predicts it would, (ii) why do 
others enter markets when economically irrational, and (iii) assessing a 
prospective entrant’s likelihood of success with the recognition that its 
optimism may bias its outlook. 
B.  Assumption that Companies Merge to Generate Significant Efficiencies 
Antitrust policy assumes that companies often merge to obtain 
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efficiencies.  “All of us know,” one Bush antitrust official remarked, “that 
the rationale for most mergers is procompetitive and that most mergers have 
no adverse effects on competition.”199  Some noted that the change from the 
1960s is “more than anything else . . . the perception that many, if not most, 
mergers are efficiency-enhancing, a fact that has come to the forefront with 
the need to permit American firms to be competitive in international 
markets.”200 The antitrust agencies believe that “[t]he vast majority of 
mergers pose no harm to consumers, and many produce efficiencies that 
benefit consumers in the form of lower prices, higher quality goods or 
services, or investments in innovation.”201  The belief is that profit-
maximizing firms merge to generate efficiencies and/or to achieve market 
power.  If the merger generates neither, it is economically irrational. 
The Merger Guidelines likewise state that the “a primary benefit of 
mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies 
and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which 
may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new 
products”202  Although the Merger Guidelines treat efficiencies as a 
defense, the merging parties can use efficiencies to explain why the merger 
will unlikely lead to coordinated effects, i.e., the efficiencies will reduce the 
merged firm’s marginal costs resulting in a “new maverick firm” that has 
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less incentive to engage in tacit or express collusion.203  Consequently, 
“[t]he Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of 
a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be 
anticompetitive in any relevant market.”204  
At times, the antitrust agencies reject the merging parties’ efficiencies 
defense, and no federal court to date has relied on efficiencies in rejecting 
the antitrust agencies’ challenge to an otherwise anticompetitive merger.  
But efficiencies continue to play a significant role in the agencies’ merger 
review.  In recent closing statements, for example, the DOJ highlighted the 
likely efficiencies from mergers in the highly concentrated telephone,205 
satellite radio,206 airline,207 and home appliance208 industries.  The DOJ 
noted that “one of the key parts” of its investigation of a proposed beer joint 
venture was having “verified that the joint venture” between Miller and 
Molson Coors was “likely to produce substantial and credible savings that 
will significantly reduce the companies' costs of producing and distributing 
beer.”209 
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Recent changes to the Merger Guidelines in 2007 and 2010 emphasize 
that “[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify . . . because much of 
the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the 
merging firms” and that, “[m]oreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and 
in good faith by the merging firms may not be realized.”210  Indeed, in 
several notable cases – AOL/Time Warner and Sony/Columbia Pictures to 
name a few – the parties fared poorly at predicting poorly the mergers’ 
likely efficiencies.211  And if the events in the financial sector in the fall of 
2008 are any indication, in many of the bank mergers that preceded the 
financial crisis, the banks failed to sustain their anticipated growths in 
profit.212  As economist F.M. Scherer observed, “making mergers is a risky 
proposition” and “perhaps the majority, fail to live up to expectations and 
may indeed make matters worse rather than better.”213  For Scherer, 
“[m]aking mergers is a form of gambling; skill matters, but there is an 
important chance component.”214 
The unrealized efficiencies in these cases may have resulted from 
incomplete information or unanticipated events (such as an economic 
downturn).  However, these phantom efficiencies may also be the result of 
the biases discussed in the behavioral economics literature. 
One explanation is that in competitive settings – such as auctions and 
bidding wars – passion may trump reason.  Rational choice theory assumes 
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that in an auction, each profit-maximizing bidder assumes that the other 
bidders are also rational.  In bidding wars (whether for antique furniture or a 
multi-million-dollar firm), passion and optimism may prevail, leading 
participants to overvalue the purchased assets.   
In a recent experiment, neuroscientists and economists combined brain 
imaging techniques and behavioral economics research to better understand 
why individuals overbid.215  Specifically, they examined whether the fear of 
losing the social competition inherent in an auction game causes people to 
overpay.  Members in the “loss-frame” group were given fifteen dollars at 
the beginning of each auction round.  If they won the auction for that round, 
they would get to keep the fifteen dollars and the payoff from the auction.  
If they lost, they would have to return the fifteen dollars.  Members in the 
“bonus-frame” group, on the other hand, were told that if they won that 
auction round they would get a fifteen-dollar bonus at the end of the round.  
Whether one gets fifteen dollars at the beginning or end of the auction 
round should not affect a rational player:  the winner of each round gets 
fifteen extra dollars, the loser gets nothing.  Nonetheless the loss-treatment 
group members outbid the bonus-treatment group members, which outbid 
the baseline group. 
A second possible explanation is that corporate executives suffer from 
“self-attribution bias,” meaning that (fueled by their successes with prior 
mergers) they are overconfident in their management skills and believe that 
the next merger would yield similar or greater efficiencies.  A study of a 
sample of public acquisitions that occurred between 1985 and 2002 found 
that CEOs who previously engaged in a successful acquisition appear to 
                                                 
215
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overly attribute their role in successful deals, leading to more deals even 
though these subsequent deals are value destructive.216  Moreover, the study 
found that CEOs tend to engage in stock purchases that reflect this bias 
(engaging in more aggressive stock acquisitions prior to each successive 
deal).217 
In short, antitrust enforcers do not regularly revisit mergers, so it is 
unclear whether the claimed efficiencies actually materialize.  Thus one 
cannot assume that most mergers are procompetitive.  More empirical 
research is needed to determine to what extent close-call mergers generate 
significant efficiencies.218  Such research may help identify factors of when, 
and under what circumstances, the claimed efficiencies will likely occur. 
C.  Assumption that Rational Big Buyers Will Thwart the Exercise of 
Market Power 
Neoclassical economics assumes that cartels are more unstable with big 
or “power buyers.”  Big buyers use their purchasing power to negotiate a 
lower price by playing one cartel member off the other.  If the cartel 
members stand firm, the big buyer can take its business to fringe firms 
outside of the cartel, sponsor a new entrant by offering non-price perks such 
as favorable product placement or more shelf space, or vertically integrate.  
Knowing this, rational cartel members likely will defect before the big 
buyer fulfills its threat.  As Posner said,  
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The concentration of the buying side of a market does inhibit collusion. 
The bigger a buyer is, the more easily and lucratively a member of the 
cartel can cheat on his fellows; for with a single transaction, less likely 
to be detected than a series of transactions, he may be able to increase 
his sales and hence profits dramatically.  But with all the members thus 
vying for the large orders of big buyers, the cartel will erode.219   
 
Again this assumption is important in weighing the costs of false 
positives and negatives.  It is hard to test the degree to which large, 
sophisticated buyers reliably defeat the formation and maintenance of tacit 
or express collusion.  Detecting cartels is difficult by itself.  Determining 
whether a cartel would have formed but for the presence of a big buyer is 
even more difficult.  One could study the extent to which cartels carved out 
markets with big buyers.  But that would not explain how cartels thrived 
despite the existence of big buyers. 
Support for the power buyer argument has waned in the federal antitrust 
agencies.220  But the issue of power buyers still arises in the agencies’ 
merger review.  In deciding not to challenge Whirlpool Corporation’s 
acquisition of Maytag Corporation, for example, the DOJ noted that “the 
large retailers through which the majority of these appliances are sold—
Sears, Lowe’s, The Home Depot and Best Buy—have alternatives available 
to help them resist an attempt by the merged entity to raise prices.”221   
Even when the antitrust agencies believe that power buyers could not 
                                                 
219
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defeat the exercise of market power, a generalist court may disagree.  
Although some courts have noted that evidence of power buyers is 
insufficient to independently rebut a prima facie case,222 the presence of 
power buyers remains an important factor courts consider in evaluating 
whether a merger violates Section 7.223 
The citric acid cartel is one example.  In 1991, a federal district court 
judge denied the DOJ’s challenge to Archer-Daniels-Midland's (“ADM”) 
long-term lease agreement with a competitor.  The court believed that 
ADM’s customers were sufficiently powerful to counteract any non-cost-
based price hike.224  The court observed that ongoing “consolidation of 
buying power [was] an effective means of counteracting any potential 
market power that might be exercised by sellers” – an observation that was 
“borne out by both economic theory and the facts.”225  The power buyers 
had “successfully used a variety of tactics to obtain low prices from [High 
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 United States v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1416, 1422 (S.D. 
Iowa 1991). 
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Fructose Corn Syrup (“HFCS”)] suppliers, including playing off suppliers 
against one another, swinging volume back and forth among suppliers, 
disciplining sellers by cutting them off entirely, successfully insisting on 
year long or multi-year tolling agreements, and holding out the threat of 
inducing a new entrant into HFCS production.”226  Consequently, “the size 
and sophistication of buyers” in the industry was “a powerful ‘other factor’ 
that strongly mitigates against the possibility of any attempt by . . . suppliers 
to raise prices anticompetitively.”227 
The DOJ later prosecuted ADM and others for engaging in a cartel 
relating to citric acid.  “What is particularly ironic is that the perpetrators 
and victims [Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble] of the citric acid cartel 
included some of the very same firms that the district court found were 
unlikely to engage in or be vulnerable to cartel activity in refusing to enjoin 
an acquisition by ADM of one of its leading rivals in the high fructose corn 
syrup market back in 1991.”228  In the ensuing private litigation, Judge 
Posner writing for the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument 
that the presence of large buyers that included Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola as 
a matter of economic theory defeated the possibility of price-fixing:  
although these “very large buyers” drove hard bargains and obtained large 
discounts from the list price of HFCS, “it does not follow that the 
defendants could not and did not fix the price of HFCS 55.”229 
Indeed, going down the DOJ’s list of Sherman Act violations yielding a 
corporate fine of $10 million or more,230 one finds other recent international 
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price-fixing cartels with big buyers as victims.  The lysine cartel – featured 
in the film The Informant! (based on a book of the same name)231 – is one 
example.  There the world’s major lysine manufacturers orchestrated an 
international cartel that caused a 70 percent price increase in its first nine 
months.  The cartel victims included Tysons Foods (the largest purchaser of 
lysine in the United States) and ConAgra (whose consumer brands are 
found in 97 percent of U.S. households232).  The liquid crystal display 
panels cartel233 harmed “some of the largest computer, television and 
cellular telephone manufacturers in the world, including Apple, Dell and 
Motorola.”234  The air transportation cartel (among the “largest and most 
far-reaching antitrust conspiracies ever detected by the Division”)235 
affected “thousands of businesses–from the corner store to the biggest 
corporation.”236  The Dynamic Random Access Memory cartel harmed 
some of the world’s largest manufacturers of personal computers and 
servers, including Dell Inc., Compaq Computer Corporation, Hewlett-
Packard Company, Apple Computer, Inc., International Business Machines 
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Corporation, and Gateway, Inc.237  The graphite electrodes conspiracy 
affected sales to steel mills in the United States and abroad.238 
So how should a generalist court respond to the defense that large 
sophisticated buyers could readily defeat the exercise of market power?  
Skeptically.  First, in the context of merger challenges, customer testimony 
is not always credible.  Indeed, in contrast to the findings in ADM,239 some 
courts have that found customer testimony as not probative of the merger’s 
likely competitive effects, considering it lacking in foundation240 or 
biased.241 
Second, the behavioral economics literature suggests that big buyers 
(like CEOs with respect to efficiencies and entry) may be overconfident of 
their negotiating prowess to defeat any non-cost-based price hike.  As a 
result, when the antitrust agencies interview big buyers, those buyers may 
not accurately project their skill and power over sellers with market or 
monopoly power.  Additionally, these buyers’ responses might be 
contingent on how the issue is framed.  For example, big buyers may be 
genuinely less concerned about protecting their customers (and thereby 
resist any non-cost-based wholesale price increase by the merging parties) 
                                                 
237
 Criminal Information, United States v. Samsung Electronics Company, Limited and 
Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., CR-05-643 (PJH) (N.D. Ca. Oct. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f212000/212010.htm. 
238
 Government's Rule 11 Memorandum, United States v. SGL Carbon 
Aktiengesellschaft and Robert J. Koehler, Criminal No. 99-244 (E.D. Pa. filed May 4, 
1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f3800/3824.htm. 
239
 ADM, 781 F. Supp. at 1416, 1422. 
240
 United States v. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that 
customer witness speculation about “what they could do in the event of an anticompetitive 
price increase . . . was not backed up by serious analysis that they had themselves 
performed or evidence they presented” and that there “was little, if any, testimony by these 
witnesses about what they would or could do or not do to avoid a price increase”). 
241
 FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 145-146 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[W]hile the 
court does not doubt the sincerity of the anxiety expressed by SPRB customers, the 
substance of the concern articulated by the customers is little more than a truism of 
economics: a decrease in the number of suppliers may lead to a decrease in the level of 
competition in the market.”); see also FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 272 (8th Cir. 
1995) (same). 
58 Behavioral Antitrust [9-Aug-10 
than taking sales away from their rivals (and thus willing to accept a supra-
competitive wholesale price, if that price was lower relative to the 
wholesale prices offered to their competitor retailers). 
Once again, more empirical research is needed to determine under what 
circumstances large, sophisticated purchasers have been successful or 
unsuccessful in preventing the exercise of market power.  In the short run, 
however, the revisions to the Merger Guidelines suggest that the agencies 
are willing to look beyond the mere fact that a large buyer exists to 
determine whether that large buyer is actually in a position to constrain 
anticompetitive conduct.242 
D.  Reliance on Optimal Deterrence Theory to Deter Cartels 
The DOJ’s criminal antitrust prosecutions are driven more by the facts 
than economic theory.  But neoclassical economic theory still influences 
antitrust policies on optimal penalties.  The generally accepted approach 
under neoclassical optimal deterrence theory is that “rational” profit-
maximizers will weigh the magnitude of a likely penalty and the probability 
of being detected against the gain from a violation before engaging in 
anticompetitive conduct.243  To achieve optimal deterrence, the total penalty 
levied against a cartel (which includes civil damages and criminal penalties) 
should equal the violation’s expected net harm to others (plus enforcement 
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costs) divided by the probability of detection and proof of the violation.244  
The DOJ, however, unlike some law-and-economics scholars,245 believes 
that corporate (or individual) fines are inadequate to deter cartels and that 
incarceration is needed. 
Over the last 50 years, Congress has considerably increased the 
maximum monetary criminal penalties and incarceration periods for 
antitrust violations.  When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, violations 
were misdemeanors with a maximum fine of $5,000 and up to one year 
incarceration.246  By 1954, however, the then head of DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division observed that “over the years a precedent has been established: 
almost never has anyone been committed to jail for a Sherman Act 
offense.”247  Congress responded with stiffer criminal penalties in 1955,248 
1971,249 1984,250 1990,251 and, most recently, 2004.252  
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Notwithstanding these repeated efforts to adjust the calculation for 
potential cartel members, it is hard to tell how well these stiffer criminal 
penalties are working.253  On the one hand, some cartels have carved out 
the United States from their operations to avoid the risk of criminal 
sanctions.254  But despite (i) the escalating criminal and civil fines in the 
U.S. (and abroad), (ii) treble private civil damages, (iii) longer jail 
sentences, and (iv) a generous leniency program, there is no indication that 
the United States has reached optimal deterrence.255  Price-fixers continue 
to make a skewed cost-benefits calculus (if they are, in fact, engaging in any 
calculus) that leads them to believe that they are better off entering a cartel 
than not. 
The behavioral economics literature suggests that situational and 
dispositional factors may account for such irrational behavior.  Optimal 
deterrence theory assumes that financial gains should motivate, and 
financial penalties should deter, self-interested rational agents’ behavior.  
But some executives refrain from price-fixing for ethical concerns, fear of 
social disapproval from their peers, or other informal norms.256  Thus 
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informal norms can have a powerful influence on behavior.  One cannot 
assume that by criminalizing conduct policymakers necessarily inculcate 
these moral and social concerns.257  In developing the informal norms 
against price-fixing by accentuating the conduct’s immoral and unethical 
content, policymakers may be able to better deter cartels.258 
Another factor is the optimism or overconfidence bias discussed above:  
just as individuals overestimate their likelihood of achieving efficiencies or 
gaining successful entry, price-fixers may also overvalue their likelihood of 
escaping prosecution.  Yet another factor is the availability heuristic, under 
which the “perceived probability of detection depend[s] on not only how 
frequently offenses are detected but also on how salient or vivid the method 
of detection is.”259  If potential cartel participants have little exposure to 
recent prosecutions, they are apt to undervalue the likelihood of being 
caught.  Some antitrust lawyers therefore find it highly effective to include 
in antitrust compliance programs a former executive involved in a price-
fixing scandal.260  
Ultimately the economic model must account for social policies that can 
influence the executives’ decision to engage in price-fixing, including the 
perceived probability of detection.261  Thus, the optimal means to deter 
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cartels will involve a pluralism of mechanisms, including criminal and civil 
penalties, structural means (improved merger review), and developing 
informal norms that highlight price-fixing’s ethical and moral implications. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS GOING FORWARD 
 
The behavioral economics literature, as Part III discusses, can help the 
antitrust agencies explore which of their assumptions premised on 
neoclassical theory are sheltering anticompetitive conduct and increasing 
the costs of false negatives.  This Part proposes several actions that the 
agencies can undertake to advance behavioral antitrust.  As a first principle 
behavioral economics can instill in antitrust policymakers the importance of 
nuance and not being tethered to particular mainstream modes of thinking 
when factual reality does not square with economic orthodoxy. 
A.  To be Applied Well, Behavioral Antitrust Requires More Empirical 
Work 
Some skeptics will continue to question whether irrational conduct has 
any implications for antitrust analysis.  But whatever its label, behavioral 
economics at its core is empirical.  The literature first identifies normative 
assumptions underlying the prevalent economic theories; second, 
empirically tests these assumptions and considers alternative explanations; 
and third, uses the anomalies to create new theories that are further 
empirically tested.  
We believe that behavioral economics identifies enough holes in the 
simplistic rationality assumption to fortify the argument for more empirical 
work in antitrust policy.  One need not be a behavioral economist to agree. 
Commissioner Kovacic, among others, has long called for more 
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empirically-driven research policies, noting how investments in knowledge 
“have long-term capital qualities”, and help ensure that the agency stays 
abreast of important developments in economic theory, empirical study, and 
legal analysis,” is a crucial element of effective case selection, “increases 
the agency's ability to attempt more complex and demanding matters,  helps 
the agency ground its cases in the best possible conceptual and empirical 
foundations, and provides assurance that the agency will not find itself 
trapped in the wrong analytical model.”262 
Competition policy’s greatest failing has been its incomplete 
understanding of how competition works in particular markets in particular 
communities at particular time periods and the interplay among private 
institutions, government institutions, and informal social, ethical, and moral 
norms.  By undertaking more empirical research, competition authorities 
will understand better the competitive dynamics of particular markets and 
how legal and informal norms interact to influence individual behavior and 
competition generally. 
Competition authorities can use many inter-disciplinary avenues to 
improve their understanding of market dynamics across different industries.  
This Article addresses two avenues:  post-merger and post-conviction 
review.263 
1. Post-Merger Review 
To illustrate the benefits of post-merger review, we will use a merger 
between two nearby non-profit hospitals in California’s Oakland-Alameda 
County region.264  The state of California sought to enjoin this hospital 
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merger under the federal antitrust laws.  Geographic market definition was 
crucial.265  The district court was confronted with the issue of where 
patients could practicably turn for acute hospital inpatients services.  If one 
defined the geographic market broadly, then one would assume that the 
merged hospitals would face stiff competition from over twenty hospitals in 
the San Francisco and East Bay areas.  With conflicting economic expert 
testimony, the district court not surprisingly followed the approach by other 
courts that relied on the Elzinga-Hogarty economic analysis for defining the 
relevant geographic market.  As the district court stated: 
the first prong of the Elzinga-Hogarty test requires a determination of 
the merging hospitals’ ‘service area,’ that area from which they attract 
their patients. In the second step, two measurements are taken of the 
flow of patients into and out of the test market. The Little In From 
Outside (“LIFO”) measurement calculates the percentage of patients 
who reside inside the test market that are admitted to those hospitals 
located within the test market. A LIFO of 100% would indicate that all 
hospital admittees who are residents of the test market are admitted to 
hospitals located within the test market. The Little Out From Inside 
(“LOFI”) measurement calculates the percentage of the test market's 
hospitals' patients who reside in the test market. A LOFI of 100% would 
indicate that all hospital patients admitted to hospitals in the test market 
are residents of the test market. A LIFO and LOFI of 75% is considered 
a weak indication of the existence of a market and a LIFO and LOFI of 
90% is considered a strong indication of a market.266   
 
The plaintiff alleged an Inner East Bay geographic market.  Plaintiff’s 
economic expert showed that 85 percent of all patients admitted to hospitals 
in the proposed Inner East Bay market resided in the Inner East Bay; the 
remaining 15 percent of patients resided outside the Inner East Bay.  
Similarly, 85 percent of patients who resided in the Inner East Bay were 
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admitted to hospitals inside this area, with the remaining 15 percent sought 
hospital treatment outside this area.  The state of California argued that the 
85% LIFO and LOFI results, along with its other evidence, were sufficient 
to prove geographic market.  The district court disagreed. The state’s 85% 
results failed to meet “the preferred 90% threshold” of LIFO and LOFI 
calculations that represent “a strong showing that a market exists.”267 
The district court also believed that big buyers (namely the health plans) 
when faced with a price increase had numerous mechanisms to discipline 
the hospitals.  The merging parties’ hospitals were approximately 2½ miles 
apart.  The State of California argued that many patients, because of traffic 
and loyalty considerations to their doctors, would be unwilling to travel east 
through the Caldecott Tunnel and west across the Bay Bridge to these other 
hospitals.  The court disagreed.  The health plan providers could keep 
hospital prices low by “steering” patients to lower cost health care 
providers.  Hospitals had high fixed costs in terms of the physical plant, 
equipment and maintaining a highly skilled staff, and consequently would 
be sensitive to such declines in patient volume.  So if the hospitals post-
merger tried to increase prices for acute inpatient care, then the rational 
profit-maximizing health plans would steer enough members away from the 
hospitals to defeat the exercise of market power.  Indeed, the president and 
CEO of the second largest health plan in the East Bay downplayed the 
possibility of a price increase by the hospitals post-merger, in part due to 
the health plans’ ability to steer patients to lower cost facilities. 
The district court also expressed greater concern over the costs of false 
positives (than false negatives), fearing that its “‘judicial intervention in a 
competitive situation can itself upset the balance of market force, bringing 
about the very ills the antitrust laws were meant to prevent.’ This appears to 
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have even more force in an industry, such as healthcare, experiencing 
significant and profound changes.”268  (The court also held that defendants 
successfully established a failing company defense.)  Accordingly, the 
district court permitted the merger to go through. 
So what happened post-merger?  Did the merged hospital try to raise 
prices at one or both hospitals?  If so, did the powerful health plans, as the 
defendants argued and as the health plan CEO and district court predicted, 
steer customers to the other Bay Area hospitals and defeat the exercise of 
market power?  Often, the antitrust agencies don’t know the answer to these 
questions.  The competition agencies devote considerable resources 
investigating ex ante the merger.  The agencies’ lawyers and economists 
work very hard to predict the merger’s likely competitive effects.  But they 
often examine only half of the picture, namely the state of competition 
several years before the merger.  Indeed, the antitrust agencies could simply 
abandon hospital mergers where the LIFO and LOFI figures fall below 90 
percent or big buyers could steer patients to other hospitals. 
After the FTC, DOJ, and California’s Attorney General lost six straight 
hospital merger challenges in the 1990s, the FTC announced its Hospital 
Merger Retrospectives Project.269  To better understand hospital 
competition and the effects of hospital mergers and update its prior 
assumptions about the consequences of particular transactions and the 
nature of competitive forces in health care, the FTC reviewed several 
consummated hospital mergers, including a retrospective study of the 
merger between the Bay Area hospitals.270  The FTC used detailed claims 
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data from three large health insurers to compare the post-merger price 
change for the merging hospitals to a set of control group hospitals.   
So what happened post-merger? Not only did prices increase post 
merger, but the price increase was among the largest of any comparable 
hospital in California.  The merged entity significantly raised prices for one 
of the merging hospitals between 23.2% and 50.4% relative to the control 
group.271 
But the FTC’s findings raise larger unanswered questions:  faced with 
this steep price increase, did the health plan providers try to steer patients to 
other hospitals?  Did patients resist?  As for the CEO who confidently 
predicted his company’s ability to defeat any price increase, what went 
wrong? 
Rather than continue to rely on empirically-unsupported assumptions, 
now is the time for the antitrust agencies to review systematically what 
actually happens post-merger.  The agencies should institute specific 
mechanisms to test empirically the following key assumptions underlying 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines:  (i) anticompetitive effects are likely to 
occur only in highly concentrated (not moderately concentrated to 
unconcentrated) markets; (ii) even in highly concentrated markets, 
anticompetitive unilateral or coordinated effects are unlikely, absent certain 
economic conditions; (iii) anticompetitive effects are unlikely, absent high 
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entry barriers; and (iv) many companies merge to generate significant 
efficiencies. 
First, the federal antitrust agencies should conduct a post-merger 
analysis of any merger subject to an extended Second Request review in 
which the agency:  (i) took no enforcement action; (ii) permitted the merger 
in part to be consummated pursuant to a consent decree; or (iii) challenged 
the merger in court, but lost.  The antitrust agency two to five years after the 
merger was consummated should examine the state of competition in that 
industry, including pricing levels and non-price components such as 
innovation, productivity, services, and quality, to the extent observable, and 
test some of their predictions when the originally reviewed the merger.   
When ending a merger investigation, the agencies typically provide 
reasons in a closing memorandum why the merger was unlikely to 
substantially lessen competition.  The closing memorandum consequently 
offers testable predictions (such as whether an entrant or big buyer would 
defeat the exercise of market power or consumers would shift to another 
product or geographic area).   
To mitigate the burden on the agencies and market participants, the 
agencies can develop a two-stage post-merger review.  In the first stage, the 
agency staff would conduct a quick-look review of competition in that 
industry.  The staff would interview a small but representative sample of 
industry participants (for example in a merger involving household 
consumer products, the staff would interview buyers from food, drug, and 
mass merchandiser retailers) about the status of competition and request 
from the merged entity a limited quantity of data, including relevant price 
data.  If the quick-look review suggests that competition significantly 
diminished, the agencies would engage in a more in-depth review and 
analyze whether they had predicted correctly.   
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The agency would report whether other variables, besides the merger, 
might explain the increase in prices or reduction in innovation, productivity, 
services, and quality.  For those companies identified as potential entrants in 
the original merger review, the reviewing agency would analyze, based on 
its interviews with these identified entrants, why they chose not to enter, or 
if they did enter, why they were ineffectual.  The reviewing agency would 
describe which, if any, of the merging parties’ efficiencies it could verify 
post-merger, the magnitude of the efficiencies, and the extent consumers 
directly benefited from such efficiencies.  
The federal antitrust agencies would also summarize their findings for 
the public, and describe annually what specific actions, if any, they are 
undertaking with respect to this data, including how they are incorporating 
the findings from this data in their merger review. 
Second, the Obama administration should request, and Congress should 
provide, the DOJ with subpoena authority for non-public information to 
conduct such post-merger review for its industries. The DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division appears to be more limited in conducting such general post-merger 
review.  Its subpoena authority in civil investigations comes from the 
Antitrust Civil Process Act,272 which limits an antitrust investigation to 
premerger activities or suspected antitrust violations.273  The FTC, in 
contrast, has broader statutory authority to gather information on the effects 
of its enforcement measures.274  This subpoena authority should be 
sufficiently broad to enable the DOJ to test (and eliminate) other 
explanations as to why competition (which includes important parameters 
beyond price) increased or diminished post-merger.  The federal antitrust 
agencies should also coordinate with other federal agencies in sharing such 
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information, subject to the data producer’s ability to challenge the 
dissemination of its commercially sensitive information. 
Third, any publicly held company that seeks to rely on an efficiency 
defense before the antitrust agencies and/or the courts should be required to 
publicly report its claimed efficiencies in its filings with the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission.  (If such disclosure would divulge a trade 
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information that would be ordinarily protected from public disclosure under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), then the antitrust agencies may excuse the public 
disclosure of such information.)  For each year post-merger (for the period 
that it claims the efficiencies will be realized), the company should report 
the actual amount of efficiencies realized versus the projected amount. This 
should temper the company executives from inflating the claimed 
efficiencies, and hold them accountable to the shareholders for pursuing a 
growth-by-acquisition strategy, while informing the agencies on those 
efficiencies for particular industries that are more likely to be cognizable 
and substantial.  
The FTC’s recent hospital merger retrospectives have been very helpful.  
But there does not exist today a built-in mechanism for routine post-merger 
review across agencies.  Empirically testing and refining the neoclassical 
economic theories underlying much of Merger Guidelines have several 
benefits.  Such empirical work promotes effective learning by creating 
feedback about the relation between the situational conditions and the 
appropriate response.  By instituting a regular and systematic review of 
close-call mergers, the agencies reduce the likelihood of false negatives and 
positives in merger review, promote more effective antitrust enforcement, 
increase transparency of the merger review process, and make themselves 
more accountable for their decisions. An empirically-driven competition 
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policy may also temper the claims, which have also increased over the past 
quarter century, of partisanship in antitrust enforcement. 
2. Post-Conviction Review 
To better understand why executives engage in price-fixing and to 
advance the empirical research on coordinated effects, the agencies should 
report two to five years after prosecuting a cartel, the state of competition in 
that industry, as described above.  With criminal cartel prosecutions, the 
DOJ typically seeks fines and incarceration; whether these measures were 
sufficient to restore competition and deter recidivism should be assessed.   
After securing its criminal convictions, the DOJ by itself or through a 
pilot program with social scientists should interview the price-fixers and 
publicly report the following:  How were the cartels (including those with 
many members) formed and enforced?  Did they act as many profit-
maximizer game theories predict, or were they more trusting and 
cooperative than these theories’ predicted outcome?275  If so, why?  As the 
number of conspirators increased, were there other specific factors that 
enabled them to collude?  Why did certain companies repeatedly violate the 
antitrust laws?  What steps did the company take after its earlier conviction 
to increase antitrust compliance, and why were they unsuccessful? 
The DOJ also should make available a computerized database 
identifying all civil and criminal antitrust consent decrees, pleas, or litigated 
actions involving cartel activity under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The 
database should include certain industry characteristics, such as: (i) the 
number of conspirators (and best estimate of their market shares); (ii) the 
length of conspiracy; (iii) the product or services market in which collusion 
occurred; (iv) the number of competitors (and their market share) who were 
not formerly alleged to be part of the conspiracy; (v) the number of entrants 
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(and their market shares) during the period of the conspiracy; and (vi) the 
nature of the conspiracy.276  This data can help those in academia, private 
practice and the antitrust agencies to better understand collusion, and further 
develop screening mechanisms to identify industries more susceptible to 
collusion.277 
One cannot assume that such empirical testing and learning will arise 
independently within competition policy.  The Supreme Court and lower 
courts cannot undertake such empirical testing as their view is limited to the 
evidence the parties supply.  Nor can academia and the private bar fulfill 
this mission.  Compiling such data can be often costly and non-public.  In 
undertaking this empirical testing and learning, the competition authorities 
can enrich the marketplace of ideas.  The data lowers the search costs for 
academics and increases transparency. 
B.  Possibilities for Incorporating Behavioral Economics into Existing 
Antitrust Doctrine 
Besides the empirical evidence needed to improve the predictive 
capabilities of antitrust’s economic theories, is there a role for behavioral 
economics to play in antitrust analysis?  Even with further empirical work, 
behavioral economics may not ultimately supply a single organizing 
principle.  It is unlikely that behavioral economics will yield a single 
concentration measure (like the HHI) to predict which mergers may 
substantially lessen competition.  Nor will behavioral economics offer a rule 
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at a broad level of generality that dictates when unilateral conduct crosses 
the debated lines from beneficial to benign to anticompetitive. 
But this is no reason to ignore the behavioral economics literature.  Life 
is messier than the Chicago School’s unifying vision of self-correcting 
markets filled with rational profit-maximizing agents that pursue their 
economic self-interest.  Relying on market fundamentalism only will lead to 
future market crises and government bailouts.  Along the way to the next 
financial crisis, there will be cases where the Chicago School’s rigid 
assumptions (which, in turn, supply the models’ predictive capabilities) fail 
to explain or predict the market behavior.  Behavioral economics can better 
explain behavior that the Chicago School ignores or marginalizes. 
So even without additional empirical work, behavioral economics may 
play a role in the agencies’ analysis in (i) instructing the courts and agencies 
to reevaluate hard cases where, on the one hand, neoclassical analysis 
suggests that the conduct is not or should not be anticompetitive but 
sufficient evidence suggest the contrary; (ii) informing the competition 
agencies whether they are indeed fulfilling their mission; and (iii) providing 
insights into possible applications of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 
1. Use of “Real World” Evidence That Is Not Explainable by Neoclassical 
Economic Theory 
At times neoclassical economic theory cannot be easily reconciled with 
evidence of the parties’ behavior, intent, motives, or post-merger plans.278 
In some instances, economic theory suggests an oligopoly’s ability to tacitly 
collude (for example to successfully implement a predatory pricing scheme) 
is impossible despite the evidence of anticompetitive intent and the fact that 
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the companies for 40 to 50 years were able to raise prices twice annually 
like clockwork.279   
In other instances, the Chicago School economic theories suggest that, 
absent inter-brand market power, a manufacturer cannot raise the price for 
its aftermarket parts or services.  Rational consumers considering the 
purchase of the equipment “will inevitably factor into [their] purchasing 
decision the expected cost of aftermarket support.”280  As the Court’s Kodak 
decision reflects, economic theory may be inconsistent with the economic 
reality, with evidence of increased prices and excluded competition.281  The 
Chicago School’s beliefs, some skeptics may say, were raised in Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Kodak.  But it is questionable whether the current Court 
would reach the same outcome in Kodak, especially if they, as Professor 
Hovenkamp and Justice Scalia, “believe that markets generally work well 
when left alone, [and] intervention is justified only in the relatively few 
cases where the judiciary can fix the problem more reliably, more cheaply, 
or more quickly than the market can fix itself.”282 
Chairman Leibowitz’s and Commissioner Rosch’s concurring 
statements in the Ovation case provide another illustration of the extent to 
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which documents reflecting the parties’ intentions and incentives can affect 
merger analysis.283 
Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc. acquired two drugs to treat patent ductus 
arteriosus (“PDA”), a serious congenital heart defect in newborns.  First, 
Ovation acquired from Merck the drug Indocin.  Several months later, 
Ovation acquired from Abbott Laboratories the U.S. rights to the drug 
NeoProfen.284  After acquiring NeoProfen, Ovation raised the price it 
charged hospitals for Indocin by nearly 1,300 percent.  In December 2008, 
the FTC challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act Ovation’s 
acquisition of NeoProfen as a merger to monopoly in a market for drugs 
used to treat PDA.  Although Commissioner Rosch voted in favor of the 
Section 7 challenge, he argued in his concurrence that Ovation’s earlier 
acquisition of Indocin was also subject to challenge under Section 7. 
Here again the actual evidence is hard to reconcile with the Chicago 
School’s neoclassical economic theories.  Specifically Indocin for many 
years was the only FDA-approved pharmaceutical treatment for PDA.  
Given Indocin’s market position, Merck (its original owner) could have 
charged a monopoly price for its drug.  Indeed under the Court’s dicta in 
Trinko, Merck’s charging a monopoly price would serve “an important 
element of the free-market system,” in that monopoly pricing serves as an 
inducement to “attract[] ‘business acumen’ in the first place” and engage in 
“risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”285 
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So one is left with two monopolists, each presumably a rational profit-
maximizer, choosing dramatically different pricing policies for a patented 
drug.  Why didn’t Merck, a large sophisticated company, sell Indocin at the 
monopoly price (under $30 per vial at the time of the acquisition)?  Perhaps 
reputational effects, said Commissioner Rosch.  If Merck sold a product 
used to treat premature babies at a monopoly price, “that could damage its 
reputation and its sales of those more profitable products.”286  It could also 
be that ethics and conscience had an impact on Merck’s pricing decision.  
But in a world of rational profit-maximizers, consumers would applaud, not 
condemn, Merck.  Charging parents whose babies were born with this 
potentially life-threatening congenital heart defect the monopoly price 
would signal others to invest in such innovative drugs.  Instead, reality 
suggests that consumers and the Chicago School economist differ at times 
in their perception of what is fair.287  
But that dynamic changed when Ovation acquired Indocin from Merck. 
Commissioner Rosch found “reason to believe that the sale of Indocin to 
Ovation had the effect of eliminating the reputational constraints on Merck 
that existed prior to the sale.”288  Specifically, Ovation lacked Merck’s 
“large product portfolio,” so Ovation “arguably was not concerned, as 
Merck had been, that the sale of Indocin at a monopoly price would damage 
its reputation and sales of more profitable products.”289  Thus, because 
Merck did not charge a monopoly price for its drug used to treat premature 
babies, Merck “arguably would not have the incentive to acquire another 
treatment that might prevent it from pricing Indocin at a monopoly 
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price.”290  Because there was evidence that the transaction substituted 
“Ovation, a firm that had an incentive to protect its ability to engage in 
monopoly pricing, for Merck, which lacked the same incentive” and that 
“Merck had no incentive to acquire NeoProfen, but Ovation had an 
incentive to do so in order to maintain its monopoly pricing in the PDA 
market,” Commissioner Rosch, joined by Chairman Leibowitz, stated that 
he would have challenged Ovation’s first acquisition as well.291 
More generally, it may be the case that behavioral economics finds its 
best fit in merger review, which is perhaps the closest antitrust enforcers 
come to in engaging in a traditional regulatory process.292  The expert 
agencies rely on a routine (including the presumptions discussed in Part III) 
to winnow their review of thousands of merger filings to a small percentage.  
For these mergers, the agencies engage in highly fact-specific inquiries; 
their conclusions in the form of closing statements and/or a consent decree 
are case specific and do not constitute binding precedent; and the review of 
the proposed merger is done ex ante rather than ex post.   
The merger review process offers the agencies with the benefit of an 
extensive factual record, including investigational submissions of the 
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parties, interviews with customers and competitors, and the parties’ 
documents.  At times neoclassical theory cannot explain the evidence of the 
merging parties’ behavior, intent, motives, or post-merger plans.  In this 
vein, the recent changes to the Merger Guidelines open the door for greater 
consideration of “direct evidence” of the type that Chairman Leibowitz and 
Commissioner Rosch credited in Ovation.  The revised Merger Guidelines, 
for example, explain that merger review is a “fact-specific process through 
which the Agencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools to the reasonably 
available and reliable evidence to evaluate competitive concerns” and will 
evaluate “several categories and sources of evidence,” including the parties’ 
documents and testimony.293  And unlike the prior Guidelines, the revised 
Merger Guidelines enumerate several categories of such direct evidence.   
The fact that the Guidelines now explicitly recognize that such evidence 
is entitled to weight on par with economic modeling may provide both the 
agencies as well as the parties with a structure for evaluating evidence in 
light of the insights that behavioral economics offers. As Commissioner 
Rosch has observed, this, in turn, could allow the agencies to more carefully 
scrutinize the close cases that neoclassical thinking predicts should be pro-
competitive or competitively neutral, but where actual evidence of how the 
firms do and will behave show otherwise.294  Behavioral economics thus 
can fill in the analysis and explain the real-world evidence when 
neoclassical economic theory cannot. 
2. A Better Informed Competition Advocate 
The federal antitrust agencies are well suited to consider how the 
behavioral economics literature can inform antitrust analysis.  
First, at a macro institutional level, the agencies can draw on the 
behavioral insights they have gained outside of federal civil antitrust law to 
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better inform their competition missions.  To this end, the DOJ can use its 
expertise in prosecuting white-collar crimes generally (and price-fixing 
conspiracies in particular) to inquire why executives, with so much to lose, 
fix prices, and why cartels are more durable and its members more trustful 
than neoclassical economic theory predicts.    
Similarly, the FTC can marry insights gained from its Bureau of 
Consumer Protection about the types of conduct that are likely to deceive 
consumers with insights from its Bureau of Economics about when such 
deception harms competition (as opposed to individual harm that does not 
significantly impair competition).  The alleged competitive harm in several 
recent Commission cases – N-Data,295 Rambus,296 and Intel297 – was 
premised, in part, on deception.  More generally, the FTC can explore ways 
that it can bring its consumer protection mission in line with a goal of 
creating and preserving consumer choice (as opposed to narrowly focusing 
on seller behavior through mandated disclosures or anti-fraud laws).298  A 
goal of protecting consumer choice requires enacting policies that, from the 
consumer’s perspective, remove barriers to optimal decision-making; 
removing those barriers, in turn, depends on analyzing how consumers 
make decisions in the first place.  Moreover, a focus on consumer choice is 
broad enough to encompass the insights from the FTC’s ongoing studies 
into behavioral economics, but not so broad as to necessarily displace the 
neoclassical emphasis on providing consumers with full-decision-making 
authority. 
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Second, the FTC and DOJ have developed substantive areas of expertise 
in certain complex and important industries, including defense, media, 
healthcare, petroleum, and pharmaceuticals.  At times, the agencies will 
observe behavior in these industries that often lead to anticompetitive 
effects--even though rational choice theory may predict otherwise.  The 
agencies can challenge these practices as presumptively illegal under a 
truncated rule-of-reason/“inherently suspect” analysis.299  The FTC, in 
particular, has recently signaled an interest in applying the “inherently 
suspect” test to specific practices.300  This framework would reduce the cost 
of error under the Court’s per se rule, without imposing the high litigation 
costs and risk of false positives and negatives under the rule of reason.301  
Third, from a procedural standpoint, the DOJ and FTC also have the 
benefit of an extensive investigational process that allows them to evaluate 
on the basis of the parties’ documents, investigational hearings, and 
economic analysis, whether and to what extent harm to competition is 
occurring.  In post-merger reviews, for example, the agencies can 
investigate whether rational profit-maximizers did indeed enter the markets 
(and if not why not).  Private antitrust plaintiffs typically do not possess 
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such extensive information, which at times is non-public and costly to 
collect.  Moreover, when it so chooses, the FTC can pursue administrative 
litigation and issue a ruling in the first instance that not only has the force of 
law (subject to federal appellate review), but provides a roadmap for federal 
appellate courts to consider in their review.   
Fourth, from a policy standpoint, the DOJ and FTC can regularly assess 
whether the agency remedies are indeed effective – a process that the FTC 
has engaged on both the antitrust302 and consumer protection side.303  Other 
agencies at times seek to promulgate rules to protect the consumer that are 
anti-competitive.  At times firms compete to exploit or help bounded 
rational consumers.  Distinguishing between the two can be challenging.  So 
the federal antitrust agencies, by understanding behavioral economics, can 
better understand when firms are providing consumers commitment devices 
to deal with their bounded willpower (e.g., Christmas savings club 
accounts) or competing in better ways to simply exploit them.   Antitrust 
authorities can offer a more nuanced and powerful message that accounts 
for consumers’ interest and protects competition than overly simplistic 
assumptions that “big is bad” or that humans behave as rational self-
interested consumers with perfect willpower. 
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3. Providing Insights into Possible Applications of Section 5 of the FTC 
Act   
Behavioral economics can inform the FTC’s application of its Section 5 
authority, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”304  Although the FTC routinely uses its Section 
5 authority in the consumer protection context, it has also applied its stand-
alone Section 5 authority in the antitrust context305 (although the scope of 
the FTC’s Section 5 authority in that context remains a subject of much 
debate). 
In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the Supreme Court stated that 
Section 5 empowers the FTC to “define and proscribe an unfair competitive 
practice, even though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the 
spirit of the antitrust laws” and to “proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive 
in their effect on competition,”306  Besides this broad statement, the Court 
has provided little guidance on Section 5’s scope or application.  Congress 
amended the FTC Act in 1994 to incorporate the consumer injury test, 
which the FTC had earlier adopted.307  Although the codification provided 
guidance on what is unfair, the Commission, academics, and practitioners 
are still sorting through what types of conduct Section 5 might cover.308 
In the context of those debates, three of the current Federal Trade 
Commissioners have observed that, because the Supreme Court has 
contracted the reach of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, using Section 
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5 of the FTC Act might be justified in those cases where anticompetitive 
conduct is occurring, but where the current antitrust doctrine does not 
supply a cause of action.309  The FTC is uniquely positioned to draw on the 
behavioral economics literature in these circumstances.  As Susan 
Creighton, former FTC Commissioner Tom Leary, and others have 
suggested, “[p]erhaps the least controversial application of a stand-alone 
Section 5 claim should be its use in ‘frontier’ settings, where it is as an 
avenue for redressing anticompetitive acts or practices that have newly 
emerged and have not yet been fully absorbed into the fabric of the 
Sherman or Clayton acts.”310  In these cases, the behavioral economics 
literature may better explain than neoclassical theory why harm is 
occurring.  So rather than try to jam a square peg (the evidence of 
anticompetitive effects and purpose) in the round hole (the current 
neoclassical economic theory underpinning the Clayton and Sherman Act 
case law), Section 5 may provide a more logical home for initially bringing 
such frontier cases.  
Behavioral economics, of course, does not arm an antitrust enforcer or 
court with unfettered discretion.  Any governmental action must be 
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sufficiently predictable, objective, and transparent under rule-of-law 
principles.  When the FTC relies on behavioral economics in the context of 
Section 5, several safeguards are already in place.  First, the FTC lacks 
authority to impose criminal penalties, seek treble monetary damages or 
obtain retrospective relief under Section 5.  Second, private plaintiffs cannot 
bring in federal court follow-on treble damage class actions for Section 5 
violations.311  Third, the FTC’s decisions are subject to review by the 
federal appellate court of the respondent’s choosing, as well as the Supreme 
Court.  Indeed, when the Commission last used Section 5 in the early 1980s, 
its findings of liability were struck down in a trio of federal appellate 
decisions which found, among other things, that the Commission failed to 
establish predictable rules and legally cognizable anticompetitive effects.312  
By all indications, the Roberts Court will impose these same 
requirements.313 
But as an added safeguard for novel cases, the FTC should use 
behavioral economics to explain strong evidence of both anticompetitive 
purpose and effects.  If corporate executives engage in conduct with the 
purpose and actual effect of harming competition, then it makes little sense 
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to immunize such anticompetitive conduct because it is unexplainable under 
the Chicago School’s neoclassical economic theories.   
CONCLUSION 
Competition policy is entering a new age.  Interest in antitrust law has 
increased world-wide, and the United States no longer holds a monopoly on 
competition policy.  The question for competition authorities is whether and 
to what extent does bounded rationality, self-interest and willpower matter. 
Courts and agencies will continue to rely on the assumption of rational, 
self-interested profit-maximizers with perfect willpower, which has become 
so embedded in antitrust policy, to predict or explain anti-competitive harm.  
But reliance on these rational-choice theories will recede in the coming 
years as they fail to explain actual market behavior.  Here the behavioral 
economics literature and other inter-disciplinary economic theories will 
advance competition policy in understanding such behavior. 
Business marketing executives have long understood behavioral 
economics.  Next came the behavioral economists and legal scholars, and 
now antitrust lawyers and policymakers are starting to study behavioral 
economics.  The Supreme Court’s economic thinking, as reflected in Trinko 
and Leegin, still lags.  But behavioral antitrust is no longer on the horizon. 
Behavioral economics is not a celebration of our shortcomings.  Putting 
aside self-interest, which is not accepted as a desirable norm, we will 
continually strive toward improving our cognitive abilities and willpower.  
Perhaps one day society may evolve in terms of rationality and willpower to 
more closely mirror the Chicago School model.  In the Paradiso, Dante 
described the light in the form of a river pouring its splendour on the banks.  
But as Beatrice explained, “The river and the topazes that pass into it and 
out and the laughter of the flowers are shadowy forecasts of their truth; not 
that these things are imperfect in themselves, but the defect is in thyself, 
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that thy vision is not yet so exalted.”314  In understanding better how we err, 
we perhaps can find ways to improve ourselves and the way we interact 
with others and, in doing do, instill rules of law that more accurately reflect 
this enhanced understanding. 
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